Everything You Need to Know About the War in Sudan

Dead bodies do not trend. That is the grim reality that the Sudanese people have discovered, as a seemingly never-ending war ravages their lands, shatters families, and threatens to tear Sudan, Africa’s third-largest country, in half. What began as a power struggle between two military leaders, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, alias Hemedti, has transformed into a relentless conflict that will leave deep wounds on the country’s psyche. And yet, despite Sudan and her people bleeding, the war is barely a flicker in the global public consciousness. The media occasionally covers it, but only when the violence reaches a fever pitch, when the death toll spikes, or the nation teeters on the brink of famine. However, this coverage, quickly lost in the noise of the global news cycle, often misses several crucial points regarding why this is happening now, who Hemedti and Al-Burhan are, and how such a vast nation can suddenly implode. Buried beneath the sporadic headlines lies a war that, if left unchecked, could have major ripple effects for the entire world.

Key Takeaways

The battle for El-Fasher escalated significantly in 2025, with the Rapid Support Forces employing siege tactics, Colombian mercenaries, and earthen berms to trap over 260,000 residents.
Sudan's systemic marginalization of non-riverine tribes laid the groundwork for the Darfur War, leading the government to formalize Arab militias into the Janjaweed.
The initial alliance between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo collapsed over disagreements regarding the timeline for integrating the RSF into the regular armed forces.
The conflict has triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, with the United Nations estimating up to 400,000 dead and famine confirmed in multiple regions across Sudan.
Foreign powers including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran, and Russia are actively fueling the conflict through weapon shipments, mercenary funding, and drone deployments.
The war threatens regional stability, driving millions of refugees into neighboring Chad and severely impacting the fragile oil-dependent economy of South Sudan.

The Siege of El Fasher and the Deepening Humanitarian Crisis

In April 2025, the BBC smuggled phones into the besieged city of El-Fasher, capital of Sudan’s North Darfur state. Under constant bombardment since the start of the war, El-Fasher had been largely cut off from the outside world, making it almost impossible for journalists or international observers to enter. The timing would prove fortuitous in a grim way, as no sooner had the communication devices arrived than the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Hemedti, launched a major attack against the city. The RSF had been aggressively trying to capture the city since the year began. In January, they launched two brutal but failed assaults that were repelled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their allies in the Darfur Joint Protection Force, a collective of former rebel factions opposed to the RSF. The April offensive was markedly different. First, it was meant to capture the entirety of North Darfur, not just El-Fasher. Second, the RSF were reinforced by Colombian mercenaries, demonstrating that foreign powers continue to quietly supply arms, money, and fighters through back channels to keep the conflict alive. Third, they captured the Zamzam refugee camp, 15 kilometers south of El-Fasher. While they had attacked the camp previously with devastating consequences for the refugees, this was the first time they converted the camp into a military base from which to attack El-Fasher. By July, they stormed into the city, marking their first significant foray there since the siege began. The defenders of El-Fasher retaliated with equal ferocity, prompting Mathilde Vu, Advocacy Manager for the Norwegian Refugee Council, to describe the city as a death trap. The July clashes were only the beginning of a grinding war of attrition. The RSF pushed forward into August with increasing ferocity. On August 2, with the help of their allies in SPLM-N al Hilu, they launched a two-pronged attack on the city. The Abu Shouk refugee camp, located 2.5 kilometers away from El-Fasher, was their next target. By August 26, they controlled half the camp, looting homes, displacing residents, and abducting civilians. Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) uncovered chilling developments when examining satellite imagery of El-Fasher in mid-2025. Since May, the RSF had constructed more than 31 kilometers of berms, encircling the city to create a kill box around El-Fasher. This made escape for the 260,000 people trapped inside almost impossible. Since sweeping across Darfur, the RSF have committed atrocities against civilians on a grand scale, with murder, kidnapping, enslavement, and sexual torture becoming commonplace. In El-Geneina alone, it is estimated that up to 15,000 may have died, while US special envoy Tom Perriello estimated the national death toll had risen to 400,000 by summer 2025.

The Historical Roots of the Janjaweed and Structural Marginalization

To understand the roots of the current conflict, one must look beyond the initial clashes of 2023 and examine the undercurrents of tension that predated the war. The origins of the paramilitaries trace back to Sudan’s western neighbor, Chad, a country ravaged by a protracted civil conflict. In 1980, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi intervened in this conflict to support his ally, Goukouni Oueddei. Gaddafi armed Arab nomads in eastern Chad, directly bordering Sudan. To act as a deterrent against forces in Chad, Khartoum armed Arabic-speaking nomads from the Rizeiqat and Miseriya tribes. These two groups formed the backbone of the Janjaweed, which loosely translates as devils on horseback. Both the Rizeiqat and Miseriya belong to the greater Baggara Arabs fraternity, a group whose historical influence had waned, replaced by the emergence of elites centered around Sudan’s Nile-valley. The resentment this created towards Khartoum became a key driver in the RSF's evolution. In 1987, belligerents in Chad reached a peace deal that ended Libyan involvement, but sporadic fighting in Sudan escalated into a full-blown rebellion by 1983. The renewed fighting gave the Arab militias ample room to grow, and Khartoum frequently utilized them to aid in the fight against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Tribes in the periphery felt profoundly disconnected from Khartoum and the decisions made by the capital's elites. According to analyst Alex De Waal in a report for the World Peace Foundation, Darfur remained the poorest region in the country. The region's healthcare system lagged far behind the rest of Sudan, severely lacking hospitals and basic infrastructure. This neglect was systemic. The government’s chief economic minds made it clear that Khartoum was focused on the Hamdi Triangle, an area comprising the commercial farms and towns within a day’s drive of Khartoum. Named after former Finance Minister Abdel Rahim Hamdi, the triangle received the vast majority of the country’s investment. Hamdi argued that by focusing on this region, the government could ensure prosperity without expending resources on peripheral areas like Darfur and Southern Sudan, which were viewed merely as labor sources. The Darfur War, where the Janjaweed cemented their place in Sudanese history, was sparked by this feeling of structural oppression, specifically allegations from non-Arab tribes that they were victims of an intensifying apartheid campaign from the Arab-led Khartoum government. The anger reached a boiling point in July 2001 when two non-Arab tribes, the Zaghawa and Fur, swore oaths to defend their territory. When discussing ethnic divisions in Sudan, the distinctions between Arab and Black identities revolve more around cultural history and entrenched hierarchies of power than skin color. To be an Arab in Sudan signifies speaking Arabic, practicing Islam, and embracing Arab customs, which became a ladder of social prestige. The Zaghawa and Fur rebels successfully attacked the army in February 2002, culminating in a devastating April 2003 assault by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) on the Sudanese air base at El Fasher. The victory was an unprecedented humiliation for the Sudanese army, destroying expensive aircraft and resulting in the capture of a Major General.

The Ascent of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and the Rapid Support Forces

Reeling from military defeats, the government in Khartoum shifted its strategy to heavily deploy the Arab militias, collectively known as the Janjaweed, to fight the insurgents. The decision to use the Janjaweed faced internal opposition; General Ibrahim Suleiman, former army chief of staff and governor of Darfur, warned that a racially based mobilization would have terrible repercussions on inter-tribal relations. He was proven right within months as the Janjaweed conducted operations that international observers, including Human Rights Watch and US Secretary of State Colin Powell, described as ethnic cleansing and genocide. During this period, the Janjaweed was led by Musa Hilal, who collaborated with Sudan's then-president Omar Al-Bashir to formalize the militia into a paramilitary force called the Border Intelligence Unit. Within this brutal formalized militia, a new leader emerged: Mohamed Dagalo, known by the nickname Hemedti. Descended from the head of a sub-clan of the Rizeiqat ethnic group, Hemedti was a former camel herder who took up arms after his trade convoy was attacked. He quickly rose through the ranks, capturing the attention of President Al-Bashir. Al-Bashir relied heavily on Hemedti, referring to him as his protector, and allowed him to maintain control over the lucrative gold mines of Darfur's Jebel Amer region. Despite a brief 2007 mutiny where Hemedti threatened to storm Nyala, he eventually struck a deal with Khartoum, securing a promotion to general, massive cash payments, and the integration of his forces into the Border Guards. Hemedti soon became a rival to Musa Hilal and was given command of his own forces, marking the birth of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF was initially constituted to fight the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N). Following vital battlefield lessons, the RSF defeated the JEM in 2015 and partook in its first international excursion. Following an agreement with Riyadh, Sudanese troops, predominantly RSF fighters, deployed to Yemen to aid the Saudi-Emirati military intervention. The operation was overseen by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the future leader of the SAF. The RSF proved highly effective in Yemen, securing vital border zones and ports, which cemented their reputation and military capability. By 2017, Hemedti controlled Sudan’s primary gold mines and commanded one of the best-equipped armed groups in the region. Al-Bashir further rewarded him by passing a law that legitimized the RSF as an independent security force. By elevating Hemedti, the dictator deliberately created a parallel power center to counterbalance the regular army, hoping the RSF would protect his regime from any potential military coup. Under Hemedti's direction, the RSF evolved from a regional militia into a highly organized parallel army, perfectly positioned to challenge the state itself when the political climate eventually fractured.

The 2019 Revolution and the Fall of the Al-Bashir Regime

While Hemedti expanded his military and financial empire, Sudan was accelerating toward an unprecedented political crisis. Omar Al-Bashir had ruled Sudan with an iron fist since his 1989 coup against Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. His regime had survived numerous uprisings, but the independence of South Sudan in July 2011 proved economically catastrophic. The secession meant Khartoum lost access to the vast majority of its oil fields, resulting in a sudden collapse in national income, runaway inflation, and a severe currency shortage. To address the economic crash, the government implemented highly unpopular austerity measures, cutting subsidies and doubling the price of essential goods like bread. The economic desperation culminated in massive public protests. The initial spark emerged in Atbara in December 2018, spreading rapidly to Port Sudan, Dongola, and Khartoum. The government attempted to blame the unrest on the Sudan Liberation Movement to frame the protests as racially motivated, but forced confessions failed to quell the public's fury. By 2019, Al-Bashir declared a state of emergency, dissolved regional governments, and replaced civilian leaders with military officers. Undeterred, the Sudanese Professionals' Association (SPA) called for a massive march to the armed forces headquarters on April 6, drawing hundreds of thousands of demonstrators who established a permanent sit-in. The sheer scale of the turnout overwhelmed the regime's security apparatus. While the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) fired live rounds at the protesters, the regular army intervened, sheltering the demonstrators and engaging the NISS in direct combat. The final collapse of the thirty-year dictatorship arrived on April 11, 2019, when General Awad Ibn Auf announced that Al-Bashir had been removed from power. Ibn Auf declared a military-led transitional government and imposed a state of emergency, a move that enraged the protesters who viewed it as a continuation of the same oppressive military apparatus. Amid intense public backlash, Ibn Auf resigned almost immediately. He was replaced by the army's inspector-general, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. At the time, Al-Burhan was relatively unknown but respected by the protesters because he had engaged with them during the sit-in and had not been implicated in international war crimes. Simultaneously, the RSF, initially designed to protect Al-Bashir, stepped aside and allowed the regime to fall. Hemedti’s refusal to fire on the protesters earned him a powerful position as Al-Burhan’s deputy in the Transitional Military Council (TMC). The initial days of the transition were marked by rapid concessions to the civilian opposition, creating a fleeting moment of optimism for Sudan's democratic future.

The Transitional Council, the 2021 Military Coup, and the Path to War

The democratic optimism following the revolution was shattered on June 3, 2019. Before dawn, the armed wing of the Transitional Military Council, comprising soldiers from the SAF, RSF, and NISS, surrounded the protest sit-in outside the army headquarters. Security forces opened fire, burned tents, and committed severe human rights abuses, leaving over a hundred dead. Following intense international pressure and suspension from the African Union, the military agreed to a power-sharing arrangement with the civilian Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). This agreement established the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), intended to guide the country toward civilian rule by late 2021, with Al-Burhan as chair and Hemedti as his deputy. Despite achieving early democratic milestones, the TSC was fundamentally unstable. The military leadership grew increasingly resistant to civilian oversight, particularly concerning the army's vast, tax-exempt commercial empire and demands to hand over Al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court. Tensions peaked in late 2021 as the scheduled handover to civilian leadership approached. Pro-military demonstrators, frustrated by the ongoing economic crisis and lack of justice, marched on the presidential palace, demanding Al-Burhan seize full control. In response, hundreds of thousands of pro-democracy citizens flooded the streets on October 21 to demand the military honor the transition. On October 25, just days before the scheduled handover, the military arrested civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other senior officials. Al-Burhan dissolved the government, declared a state of emergency, and appointed a new cabinet heavily stacked with Al-Bashir-era loyalists. Both Al-Burhan and Hemedti publicly justified the coup as a necessary measure to prevent civil war, but international observers widely recognized it as a maneuver to protect military wealth and shield commanders from prosecution. The coup triggered fierce domestic resistance and catastrophic international isolation, with the US, EU, and World Bank freezing millions in crucial financial aid. The ensuing economic collapse severely strained the alliance between Al-Burhan and Hemedti. Hemedti, sensing the shifting political winds, began distancing himself from the SAF, opposing the reinstatement of the old Khartoum elites who had historically marginalized his tribal base. The rift widened considerably over the issue of security sector reform. During negotiations to form a new civilian government, Hemedti and his civilian allies advocated for a ten-year timeline to integrate the RSF into the national army, while Al-Burhan demanded integration within two years to swiftly neutralize Hemedti’s power base. By April 2023, RSF troops aggressively deployed near a strategic airbase in Meroe, ignoring SAF ultimatums to withdraw and setting the stage for open warfare.

The Eruption of Atrocities and the Realignment of Rebel Alliances

The underlying tensions finally erupted into full-scale war on April 15, 2023. Violence immediately engulfed the nation, with fighter jets bombing Khartoum, a capital city that had previously been spared the destruction of Sudan's peripheral wars. Both sides possessed troops stationed throughout the country, resulting in simultaneous battles across multiple states. The SAF headquarters were quickly encircled, trapping Al-Burhan inside for three months before he managed to escape to Port Sudan. Meanwhile, the paramilitaries overran SAF bases across the capital and launched a sweeping offensive across Darfur, capturing strategic cities like Nyala and Zalingei with devastating speed. The human cost of the rapid military maneuvers was catastrophic. As the RSF seized the city of El-Geneina, they initiated systematic ethnic massacres targeting the Masalit tribe. Reports later confirmed a massacre in the Ardamata neighborhood where at least 10,000 people were killed. The atrocities mirrored the darkest days of the early 2000s, with extreme violence, mass executions, and widespread sexual violence weaponized against civilians. Former US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken explicitly concluded that the RSF and allied militias were actively committing genocide. Simultaneously, the SAF faced severe accusations of war crimes for indiscriminate aerial bombardments and enforcing sieges that pushed entire regions toward starvation. Recognizing that neither faction could achieve total victory independently, both Al-Burhan and Hemedti sought crucial alliances with former rebel groups. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), active in the Blue Nile and Kordofan states, fractured under the pressure. Malik Agar allied his faction with Al-Burhan, earning the position of deputy head of the TSC, while Abdelaziz Al-Hilu aligned his forces with Hemedti. This dynamic dragged the volatile southern periphery into the conflict, with SPLM-N Al-Hilu forces attacking and capturing undermanned SAF garrisons in South Kordofan. As the war expanded, it unleashed a catastrophic famine. By the autumn of 2025, hunger in Sudan reached unprecedented levels, with famine confirmed in ten areas and seventeen more at severe risk. Armed factions routinely restricted access to aid in regions held by their opponents, turning starvation into a weapon of war. The World Food Programme warned that Sudan risked becoming the world’s largest hunger crisis in recent history, emphasizing that without massive humanitarian intervention, hundreds of thousands of civilians were destined to die. Al-Burhan further bolstered his ranks by allying with Islamist groups and Darfuri ethnic militias, while Hemedti secured support from various Sudan Liberation Movement splinter factions, creating a highly volatile matrix of regional warlords.

Regional Proxy Warfare and the Struggle for Strategic Dominance

Despite early warnings from international bodies to avoid involvement, the war in Sudan quickly transformed into a sprawling proxy conflict involving over ten nations across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Each foreign power engaged in the conflict possesses distinct strategic and economic interests. Ethiopia leaned toward supporting the RSF due to shared ties with the United Arab Emirates, while opposition groups hostile to Addis Ababa favored the SAF. Egypt officially maintained neutrality but provided substantial support to the SAF, viewing the established military as a stabilizing force. Egypt's involvement included supplying Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones and exerting influence over key military decisions in Khartoum. Libya’s involvement centered around Khalifa Haftar, who utilized his deep ties to the UAE to bolster Hemedti's forces. This network facilitated the training of RSF fighters, troop exchanges, and the establishment of illicit trade routes. S&P Global reported that Libya acted as a critical node in a smuggling network, importing Russian oil through Turkish middlemen and moving it across porous borders to the RSF. This illicit fuel trade generated billions in revenue, enabling the paramilitaries to hire thousands of mercenaries from Chad, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Niger, paying exorbitant salaries to heavily armed fighters from impoverished regions. The United Arab Emirates emerged as the RSF's most significant international backer, driven by desires to secure agricultural land, control Sudanese gold exports, and counter Saudi influence while suppressing political Islam. In response to the RSF's growing power, the SAF turned to Iran, renewing a diplomatic and military relationship that had been severed in 2016. By late 2023, Iranian cargo planes were delivering advanced Mohajer and Ababil drones to Port Sudan. These weapons provided the SAF with critical surveillance and strike capabilities, serving as a vital technological equalizer that helped the army repel paramilitary advances. For Tehran, establishing a foothold in Sudan offered strategic leverage over the Red Sea and regional rivals. Russia’s allegiances fluctuated dynamically based on battlefield momentum. Initially, the Wagner Group backed Hemedti to secure gold smuggling routes intended to fund operations in Ukraine. However, following the absorption of Wagner into broader Russian state structures, Moscow prioritized naval access in the Horn of Africa. Recognizing the strategic value of Port Sudan for monitoring global shipping and projecting power, the Kremlin pivoted to support the SAF in early 2025 in exchange for a promised naval facility. This complex web of international weapon shipments, mercenary funding, and geopolitical bartering has entrenched the conflict, making any domestic resolution nearly impossible without broader regional consensus.

The Global Spillover, Border Crises, and the Threat of Partition

The intense fighting inside Sudan has triggered massive displacement, severely destabilizing neighboring countries. The United Nations estimates that over a million refugees have crossed into Chad, overwhelming isolated and impoverished eastern provinces like Ouaddaï. The local population surged by sixty percent in just two years, driving up the cost of basic commodities and sparking localized friction. Furthermore, the SAF accused Chad of acting as a transit hub for UAE-supplied weapons destined for the RSF, utilizing a heavily guarded field hospital as a cover for military logistics. The spillover into border zones with Egypt and Libya has heightened fears that the entire Horn of Africa is facing a systemic collapse. South Sudan, highly dependent on oil revenues and a pipeline transiting through Sudan, faced immediate crisis when infrastructure damage severed its only export route. The disruption caused massive economic panic in Juba, exposing the fragility of a nation still recovering from its own brutal civil war. Over a million people fled across the southern border, placing immense strain on South Sudan. RSF paramilitaries have repeatedly crossed into Upper Nile state, navigating complex alliances with local Nuer militias while trading weapons for fuel. The presence of UAE-backed facilities in South Sudan suggests that regional powers are leveraging the chaos to exert influence across multiple vulnerable governments. Inside Sudan, the military reality remains highly fluid and brutal. After facing potential collapse throughout 2023 and early 2024, the SAF launched a massive counteroffensive in September 2024, propelled by Iranian drone technology. The army successfully recaptured strategic locations including Wad Madani, Khartoum Bari, and the capital itself, eventually pushing west to secure the supply city of Bara. Conversely, Hemedti’s forces established a powerful stronghold across Darfur, recently inaugurating a parallel government in Nyala. This geopolitical reality suggests that the paramilitaries are actively preparing to permanently partition the nation, maintaining control over vast western territories with the backing of their international sponsors. More than 25 million people currently require immediate humanitarian assistance, the health infrastructure has collapsed, and the economy has suffered staggering losses exceeding $26 billion. Despite the ruin, neither Al-Burhan nor Hemedti shows genuine interest in peace, as both commanders believe absolute military victory remains possible. Human rights activists like Awadiya Mahmoud emphasize that the Sudanese people simply want the war to stop, while displaced civilians like Fatimmah pray for a future where children can learn rather than flee. Yet, without decisive intervention to curb foreign meddling, Sudan remains trapped in a profound crisis, marching toward a fractured and devastating future.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the main reason for the war in Sudan?

The main reason for the war in Sudan is a vicious struggle for power between the army and a powerful paramilitary group, specifically between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, which began in April 2023 and has since decimated the country, with civilians subject to frequent attacks and human rights violations.

Which of the following statements best describes the effects of civil war in Sudan?

The effects of civil war in Sudan have been devastating, with a bitter race to claim economic and political power dividing the country, and the human cost can no longer be ignored, making Sudan the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world, with widespread documentation of famine, atrocities, and a death toll that has been rising since the start of the conflict.

What was the main reason behind South Sudan's secession?

Although the provided context does not directly address the main reason behind South Sudan's secession, it is widely known that South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011 after a long civil war, with the main reason being a desire for self-governance and autonomy, particularly after the second Sudanese civil war from 1983 to 2005, which killed an estimated two million people.

What started the war in Sudan?

The war in Sudan started on April 15, 2023, when fighting erupted between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, with a series of events unfolding, including a failed truce and a jailbreak, which ultimately led to a full-blown conflict that has been ongoing for almost three years.

What does 249 mean in Sudan?

The provided context does not specifically mention what 249 means in Sudan, and without further information, it is unclear what this number refers to, although it could potentially be a reference to a specific article, code, or identifier related to Sudanese law, politics, or culture.

Who does the US support in Sudan?

The provided context does not explicitly state who the US supports in Sudan, although it mentions that foreign powers have their fingerprints all over the conflict, quietly supplying arms, money, and fighters through back channels to keep the conflict alive, suggesting that the US may be involved in some capacity, possibly through diplomatic or humanitarian efforts, but the exact nature of their support is unclear.

What is the current status of Sudan's conflict?

The current status of Sudan's conflict is that it is ongoing, with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) engaged in a grinding war of attrition, particularly in the city of El-Fasher, which has been under siege since the start of the war, with the RSF launching repeated attacks and the SAF retaliating with equal ferocity, resulting in a humanitarian crisis that continues to worsen.

What is the conflict crisis in Sudan?

The conflict crisis in Sudan is a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions, with the war having decimated the country, and civilians subject to frequent attacks, human rights violations, and atrocities, including murder, kidnapping, enslavement, and sexual torture, with the city of El-Fasher being a particular flashpoint, and the conflict having a significant impact on the entire region, making Sudan the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world.