Blueprints for the Next Pakistan-India War

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have hardly been able to keep their hands off of each other. This is not a reference to a lusty gesture of passionate love, but rather to the opposite: a bitter enmity, sparked in part by their respective claims over the territory of Kashmir. This enmity has erupted into four wars, as well as numerous border skirmishes, attacks conducted by proxy, and surgical retaliations. The most recent bout of this endless South Asian rivalry took place in May 2025, a short conflict which luckily de-escalated very quickly, with both Delhi and Islamabad claiming victory. It should accurately be referred to as Rawalpindi, as it is home to the Joint Staff Headquarters of the Pakistan Armed Forces. Delhi and Rawalpindi turned off the heat pretty quickly during that incident, but the pressing question remains: what if the two rivals were to engage once again in a full-blown war? The modern capabilities and strategic postures of both nations offer highly detailed scenarios of how such a conflict would unfold.

Key Takeaways

• India commands a massive $83.6 billion defense budget, funding more than 1.4 million active troops and a sprawling mechanized arsenal.
• Pakistan counters numerical disadvantages with over 1,000 drones, early warning systems, and a formidable localized military-industrial complex.
• India’s Cold Start doctrine relies on eight battle groups executing shallow incursions to secure tactical leverage before a nuclear response.
• Pakistan’s New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF) emphasizes rapid combined arms deployments designed to secure a localized stalemate against invasions.
• The Sundarji Doctrine outlines a devastating three-pronged deep strike aimed at bisecting Pakistan, supported by air supremacy and amphibious landings.
• China’s vital investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor position Beijing as the inevitable broker enforcing any future ceasefire.

The Balance of Power and Arsenal Disparities

The Joint Chiefs of Staff of both countries hold within their drawers some highly precise blueprints, or war plans, for a range of potential conflict scenarios. Based on publicly available sources, such as strategy and policy papers, reports on the respective armed forces’ personnel and equipment, accounts of precedent conflicts, as well as descriptions of recently conducted war games and military exercises, likely scenarios of how the next war might pan out can be explored with escalating degrees of intensity. Before concocting a blueprint for a hypothetical future war, what India and Pakistan would each bring to the fight is worth examining. According to sources such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the International Centre for Sustainability, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, based on sheer numbers alone, India easily appears as the larger, stronger, and richer power. As of 2025, India can field more than 1.4 million active-duty personnel, of which the vast majority, 1.2 million, serve in the land army. By comparison, Pakistani forces amount to 660,000 active-duty personnel, with 560,000 serving on land. Both sides can deploy massive numbers of troops on the ground, but clearly, India has the numerical advantage. When looking at the respective fleets of vehicles, the disparity is not as marked. Combining main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery, on the Indian side there is a total of a little over 7,100 tracked or wheeled units. Pakistan, while employing less than half of India’s soldiers, can field a little more than 6,600 of those metal beasts. Delhi takes the lead in main battle tanks, with a difference of more than 1,200 compared to Rawalpindi. However, the latter has absolute dominance when it comes to self-propelled artillery, holding 552 units against 100. Some artillery batteries are towed, while others fire rockets and missiles from a reasonably safe distance away from the battlefield. In this category, India is once more at the top, boasting a two-to-one ratio compared to Pakistan in towed and rocket artillery. Lifting the gaze to the skies in search of fixed-wing aircraft, the Indian Air Force controls 663 fighters and ground attack craft, including Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKIs, French Rafales, and the locally made Tejas Mark 2. By 2027, Indian pilots may also be able to fly an AMCA, or Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, a locally developed and produced fifth-generation stealth fighter. These jets are supported by 203 logistics planes, and seven surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning craft. Cultural reflections of this rivalry exist in the 2024 Bollywood film ‘Fighter’ and the 2019 Pakistani Lollywood production ‘Sherdil’ or ‘Lionheart,’ which features heroic Pakistan Air Force pilots engaging in dogfights against the Indian Air Force. Today, Pakistani pilots fly one of the 417 fighters with the Pakistan Air Force, mainly F-16s, JF-17s, and JC-10s procured from the United States and China. Pakistani wings are therefore at a numerical disadvantage compared to their rivals, although they can deploy 22 surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning craft, more than three times India’s contingent. Islamabad is in the minority also when it comes to the rotary-wing department, where India boasts a 3.5-to-1 advantage.

Unmanned Systems and Naval Projection

Not all that flies carries a pilot. Much like most militaries in the world, the South Asian powers have heavily invested in the import and local development of surveillance and attack drones. Their overall numbers remain a mystery. Recent reports by the BBC and the Observer Research Foundation indicate that Pakistan has the numerical advantage, with a fleet exceeding one thousand units. The same sources suggest that India’s drone fleet, by comparison, is rather modest, with fewer than 200 unmanned vehicles, of which the vast majority are used for surveillance purposes only. This force may be beefed up by a shipment of 31 MQ-9B Predator drones, plus up to 50 further combat UAVs by 2028, as announced in July 2025 by Air Commodore Sandeep Singh. Yet the Indian military may control a much higher number of drones. According to Reuters and Defense News, the Armed Forces had procured at least 2,000 drones in various roles back in 2022, which may be already operational. While drone supremacy is open to discussion, India certainly has the numbers in air-defense weapons systems, with more than 3,200 anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missile batteries, almost twice as many as Pakistan. The most crushing difference between these militaries can be observed in their naval forces. The Pakistan Navy sails 11 frigates and five conventional submarines, which are good enough to patrol their coasts and defend their territorial waters. The Indian Navy can deploy some more serious power projection, with its 29 surface vessels, which include two aircraft carriers, and 18 submarines. Two of these are nuclear-powered and equipped with ballistic missiles. The only domain in which the two powers are evenly matched is the nuclear one. Delhi has the capability to launch a total of 172 nuclear warheads, and Rawalpindi 170. Focusing on conventional warfare is key, but it is important to point out the balance of power, with both countries quite able to reduce the opponent to devastation. Besides nuclear weapons, the reason for the imbalance in all other armed forces is financial resources. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, back in 1960 the military expenditure of the two countries was not too far apart. India committed 2 percent of its GDP, equivalent to $3.3 billion in modern value, while Pakistan committed almost $600 million, or 4.3 percent of its GDP. Over time, military expenditure has progressively increased for both powers, and Pakistan consistently committed a higher percentage of their GDP to the defense budget, compared to India. The key factor is that India is simply the larger economy, and its rise in the past decades has been meteoric. As of 2024, the Indian armed forces received funding to the tune of $83.6 billion, which is more than France spends on defense, only a hair below what the United Kingdom spends, and is ten times Pakistani military expenditure. The two countries combined dedicate almost $100 billion to their defense budgets to buy vast catalogs of modern weaponry.

Defense Industry and Historical Context

Both Delhi and Islamabad rely on international partners willing to supply their modern arsenals. Up to 2013, 76 percent of India’s defense imports came from Moscow. Russia still remains the biggest vendor, although the ratio has declined to 36 percent in recent years. France, Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom complete the top five of the Indian military’s chief suppliers. Pakistan has solid relationships with American defense industries, but its key partner and supplier is China, an ‘all-weather’ strategic ally since 1962. If international partners are unable or unwilling to fulfill their shipments, both powers must rely on a local armament sector. India’s defense industrial base is one of the largest in the region, driven by state-owned enterprises, government research institutions, and a generous helping of a growing private sector. In the fiscal year 2023-24, the value of domestic arms production equaled some $17 billion, a more than 170 percent increase compared to the previous decade. This production has materialized as missiles, air defense systems, armored vehicles, drones, and naval vessels. Very soon, India will release the first prototype of its indigenous fifth-generation stealth fighter. Across the border, Pakistan’s industrial base is mainly concentrated in the government’s hands and is relatively strong in the production of small arms, armored vehicles, drones, and licensed copies of Chinese fighter jets. While Pakistan does not publish official figures on domestic production, the overall output is smaller compared to India’s, both in terms of quantity and variety of weapons systems. Moreover, local industrial complexes, such as Pakistani Ordnance Factories or Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, are heavily dependent on the import of components and spare parts. If the two rivals were to be suddenly isolated by international allies, India would be overall in a better position to sustain a prolonged conventional war. However, it is not a given that the more numerous, better-funded force easily gains the upper hand against a smaller conventional military. Just like Vladimir Putin’s army against Ukraine, raw numbers do not guarantee rapid success. This concept applies to previous Indo-Pakistani conflicts, in which Rawalpindi was able to hold its own tactically before international arbitration reinstated the status quo ante bellum. The big exception was the war of 1971, in which a decisive Indian victory brought about the independence of Bangladesh, formerly known as East Pakistan. Otherwise, Indo-Pakistani conflicts revolved around the disputed Kashmir region and were initiated by Islamabad’s proxy actors, including tribal militias, Islamist groups, or other irregular forces launching actions beyond the Line of Control. In the 1947, 1965, and 1999 conflicts, India responded to Pakistan’s actions by launching large operations with conventional forces, either in Kashmir, Punjab, or Rajasthan. Delhi’s forces made significant gains on several occasions but were mostly held back from achieving a decisive victory. International partners invariably stepped in to broker a ceasefire and a return to the Line of Control. Following Pakistan’s emergence as a nuclear power in the late 1990s, India preferred not to escalate matters with large conventional offensives. Conflicts in the 21st century largely consisted of episodic border skirmishes or militant attacks followed by Indian surgical strikes, while Pakistan actively defended its air space.

The Short War Scenario and Nuclear Doctrines

Armed with this knowledge of Indian and Pakistani capabilities, blueprints for a future war can be outlined in escalating intensity. The opening scenario mirrors the actual conflict in the spring of 2025. It kicks off with a terrorist attack on Indian soil by a militant group backed by Pakistan. Islamabad and Rawalpindi may deny their involvement in, or knowledge of, the attack, but India’s likely reaction involves launching a signature surgical strike. This may involve the use of missiles, the air force, drones, or all of the above. In May 2025, the Pakistan Air Force performed rather well compared to their Indian counterparts, shooting down up to five fighter jets and one UAV. In a future engagement, Pakistan may be able to negate India’s air superiority by taking advantage of their larger fleet of surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning craft. If the next air battle takes place in the mid-2030s, the Indian Air Force might deploy the locally developed fifth-generation stealth fighter, gaining an edge unless Pakistani local arms programs or their Chinese suppliers keep up with advanced systems. The drone conundrum dictates that the number and quality of UAVs will heavily influence which side rules the skies. Drones are outgunned by manned craft but can still deal enormous damage against radar installations and air defenses on the ground. Whatever the technology or tactics employed in this scenario, the most likely outcome is that it will fizzle out within a matter of days. After exchanging missile strikes, artillery, and small arms fire across borders and the Line of Control, international partners would step in. The Presidents of the United States, France, and Russia, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the General Secretary of the United Nations would all deliver a consistent message demanding a halt. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party would likely deliver a message to India not to escalate a border crisis with another nuclear power, and a message to Pakistan warning against jeopardizing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is a massive infrastructure project part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, designed to safely trade with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe while ensuring energy imports into China. Delhi and Rawalpindi may grumble at the interference in Beijing and elsewhere, but eventually concede it is not in their interest to escalate matters toward a nuclear exchange. Both India and Pakistan have adopted an overall nuclear doctrine defined as Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD), keeping minimal nuclear strike capabilities to deter a rival power. However, the interpretations differ. India espouses a ‘no first use’ policy, indicating they would deploy an atomic strike only if attacked first. Pakistan has adopted a posture defined as Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD), meaning Pakistan is ready to launch a first nuclear strike if its territorial integrity is threatened by conventional forces. FSD calls for the use of low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons against invading columns. Since even the launch of a single tactical weapon may escalate into an all-out nuclear exchange, cooler heads will typically prevail, conference centers will be booked, and an agreement to return to the status quo will be signed.

The Cold Start Blueprint and Defensive Counters

A second blueprint, known as the ‘Cold Start Scenario,’ comes into play if Indian Chiefs of Staff determine that their Pakistani counterparts might be reluctant to immediately fire tactical nuclear weapons. This is based on an Indian military doctrine developed in the mid-2000s and never formally acknowledged by Delhi. Previously, the Indian Armed Forces adhered to the ambitious ‘Sundarji’ doctrine, which envisioned the use of ten army corps, or up to 450,000 personnel, to launch an invasion of Pakistan. The Sundarji plans came into question in 1998 after Pakistan conducted its first successful nuclear tests. They were further proven obsolete by Operation Parakram in 2001 and 2002, a massive mobilization responding to a December 13, 2001, terror attack perpetrated by Jaish-e-Mohammed against the parliament in Delhi. Parakram took 27 days to mobilize strike corps to the border, by which time international diplomacy had already intervened. The realization that mobilizing massive conventional forces took too long and risked a tactical nuclear strike led to the Cold Start doctrine. This rewrite reduced the force to eight division-sized battle groups, totaling 80,000 to 120,000 men. Within three to four days of mobilization orders, these units would launch multiple strikes across the border along multiple axes of advance. Cold Start battle groups pursue the seizure of limited, preferably uninhabited territory adjacent to the border. Quick, shallow territorial gains would enable Delhi to take the lead in post-conflict negotiations and extract concessions from Islamabad, while preventing third parties from imposing a ceasefire too quickly. Most importantly, a rapid stop would defuse a nuclear escalation. A glimpse into this capability was provided by the ‘Ram Prahar’ military exercise in November 2025. Led by the Army’s Western Command, it involved 20,000 personnel manning tanks, amphibious armored vehicles, fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and drones simulating an offensive against Pakistan across the plains of Punjab. Pakistan’s response to this is their ‘New Concept of War Fighting,’ or NCWF, developed directly to counter Cold Start. Perfected between 2009 and 2013 during military exercises codenamed ‘Azm-e-nau’ or ‘New Resolve,’ the Army created division-sized combined arms fighting forces able to mobilize independently with close support from the Air Force and cruise missiles. According to military sources cited by ‘The Diplomat’ in March 2017, Pakistani forces would mobilize faster than India’s. The ultimate goal of the NCWF is not to completely destroy an invading Indian force but to achieve a stalemate, conceding that limited territorial losses are acceptable. An offensive could start with Indian paratroopers dropped across the border, followed by battle groups rolling into Punjab aiming to threaten Lahore. Pakistani forces would slow down the invading battle groups by deploying missile and artillery barrages. Eventually, the Indian advance comes to a stop short of Lahore. Generals in both Delhi and Rawalpindi claim tactical victories based on their respective doctrines, and the international community, led by Beijing, exerts pressure for a quick diplomatic resolution involving the dismantling of militant training camps.

The Sundarji-Riposte Scenario and Deep Strikes

If nuclear weapons are completely removed from the geopolitical equation, a third scenario emerges based on two older combat doctrines: ‘The Riposte’ and the ‘Sundarji Doctrine.’ Up to the mid-1980s, Pakistan favored an aggressive combat doctrine dubbed ‘The Riposte’ by retired Indian Major General Amarjit Singh, which combined war by proxy with an offensive stance. This envisaged an initial infiltration of trained insurgents into Kashmir to foment dissent. While the Indian military dealt with these jabs, Pakistani conventional forces would deliver a devastating strike across the border, punching India around the city of Akhnoor in Jammu, or south of the river Sutlej in Punjab. Both objectives lack large natural barriers on the way. Recent drills conducted by the Pakistan Army in April and early May 2025, deploying artillery, tanks, and infantry just north of Lahore in an area bordering Jammu and Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh, suggest these offensive elements might still be relevant to current war strategies. India might react by putting into practice the 1981 ‘Sundarji Doctrine,’ named after former Indian Army Chief of Staff Krishnaswamy Sundarji. According to this doctrine, the Indian Army would mobilize ten corps. Seven corps, up to 315,000 personnel, would be positioned along the border tasked with ‘deterrence-by-denial’ to halt enemy offensives. The remaining three corps, or 135,000 troops, would be in charge of ‘Deterrence by Punishment.’ The Indian Air Force would establish air superiority and provide close air support to the three strike army corps, allowing them to penetrate deep into Pakistan, possibly bisecting it. Recent hints, such as the April 2017 ‘Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces’ (JDIAF-2017), recognize the importance of capturing sizable portions of enemy territory. The ambitious military exercise ‘Trishul’ in November 2025 validated joint operations across the desert sectors of Rajasthan and Gujarat, in coordination with naval and amphibious actions in the North Arabian Sea, showing India preparing for a deep, deadly, three-pronged attack. In this scenario, after an initial Pakistani advance toward Akhnoor is held by Indian defensive lines, Delhi unleashes deterrence by punishment. The Indian Navy prepares for an amphibious landing, targeted by Pakistani coastal batteries equipped with Chinese YJ-20 anti-ship missiles. Eventually establishing a bridgehead near the N10 or N25 highways, armored columns simultaneously cross the border from Rajasthan and Gujarat. Units from Gujarat head toward Karachi and Hyderabad, while those from Rajasthan move toward the border with Afghanistan, eventually turning south to envelop cities from the rear. In a parallel universe, India’s sheer numbers, massive budget, and strategic depth would ensure a decisive victory in a pure war of attrition. However, in reality, China would supply Pakistan with a steady flow of weapons to hold back the invasion, but would ultimately impose a ceasefire to protect the CPEC. Action shifts to a meeting room, leaving India with contained territorial losses pushed back in Akhnoor and Punjab, and potentially bringing People’s Liberation Army troops to deploy along the Corridor.

Implications of Perpetual Conflict and Realpolitik

Plotting potential blueprints for conflicts must remain grounded in the pragmatic considerations of real politics, or risk invading the realms of alternate history and science fiction. The reality of any possible future Indo-Pakistani war is that these conflicts will ultimately be contained, short, and relatively bloodless. Future bouts will likely peter out in a matter of days due to several massive geopolitical and military constraints. First, there are two superpowers who have the best interest in maintaining the stability and integrity of Pakistan. China requires a stable environment for its economic initiatives, and the United States considers Islamabad a key regional ally, leading both powers to exert all diplomatic influence to de-escalate any South Asian conflagration. The second massive constraint is the nuclear deterrent. The long-standing rivals have matching nuclear arsenals governed by a stabilizing combination of doctrines. India adheres to a no-first-use policy, while Pakistan is openly willing to deliver a first, tactical nuclear strike. This asymmetrical posture is ironically the best possible combination to maintain stability in the region; if both powers were to espouse no-first-use, they might easily slip into a massive conventional escalation. The third and ultimate reason these conflicts remain limited is that neither country is genuinely interested in fighting a full-scale war against the other. As highlighted by analyses from journalists such as Riazat Butt with the Associated Press, neither country has the desire to significantly harm the other’s population or compete for resources. Other than Kashmir, they have no interest in claiming the other’s territory or exercising dominance. According to interpretations by military officers such as Indian Lieutenant General Shokin Chauhan, the Pakistani military is not interested in winning a decisive victory against Delhi or annexing the entirety of Kashmir and Jammu. The institutional focus is less about conquering territory than about maintaining the perpetual war posture, keeping the option to continue conflict indefinitely. By enabling a state of low-intensity, perpetual war, military leaders preserve their institutional authority and reinforce their indispensability in the domestic narrative. The conclusion is that neither India nor Pakistan is interested in achieving total war aims or threatening the other country’s very existence. The ultimate goal is maintaining a state of constant tension centered upon the threat of a confrontation over Kashmir. Consequently, the two powers may never achieve a definitive state of peace, destined instead to re-enact endless contained replays of border conflicts for the decades to come.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the main reason for the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir?

The main reason for the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is their respective claims over the territory, which has erupted into four wars and numerous border skirmishes since 1947, with the most recent conflict occurring on 6 May 2025, when India carried out coordinated missile strikes targeting nine sites deep inside Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Which army is powerful, India or Pakistan?

According to sources such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, India appears as the larger, stronger, richer power, with 1.4 million active-duty personnel, including 1.2 million in the land army, compared to Pakistan’s 660,000 active-duty personnel, with 560,000 serving on land, giving India a numerical advantage.

Why is India going to war with Pakistan?

The conflict between India and Pakistan is driven by their bitter enmity, sparked by their respective claims over the territory of Kashmir, which has led to four wars and numerous border skirmishes, with the next war potentially being triggered by escalating degrees of intensity, as analyzed by Arzan Tarapore in the context of the India–Pakistan military dynamic.

What is the conflict between India and Pakistan?

The conflict between India and Pakistan is a longstanding rivalry that has erupted into four wars, including the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1947-1948, 1965, 1971, and the Kargil War of 1999, with three of these wars being fought over Kashmir, and numerous border skirmishes and proxy attacks, as well as surgical retaliations, with the most recent conflict occurring on 6 May 2025.

What caused India and Pakistan to split apart?

India and Pakistan split apart in 1947, when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned into two separate countries, with Kashmir becoming a disputed territory, leading to a longstanding rivalry and conflict between the two nations, which has been fueled by their respective claims over the territory and has resulted in four wars and numerous border skirmishes.

How many times Pakistan beat India?

India and Pakistan have fought four wars since independence, in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999, with three of these wars being fought over Kashmir, and the outcome of these wars has varied, but Pakistan has not decisively ‘beaten’ India in any of these conflicts, with the most recent conflict on 6 May 2025 resulting in both Delhi and Rawalpindi claiming victory.

What is the new concept of war fighting in Pakistan?

The new concept of war fighting in Pakistan is not explicitly stated, but according to Arnaldo Teodorani, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both India and Pakistan likely have precise blueprints or war plans for a range of potential conflict scenarios, which would involve the use of various military assets, including fighter jets, tanks, and artillery, with Pakistan potentially employing its dominance in self-propelled artillery to counter India’s numerical advantage.

Is Pakistan declared war?

On 6 May 2025, India carried out coordinated missile strikes targeting nine sites deep inside Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which could be considered an act of war, but the conflict was quickly de-escalated, with both Delhi and Rawalpindi claiming victory, and it is not clear if Pakistan has officially declared war on India, but the two nations have a longstanding rivalry and conflict over Kashmir.

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