Air Supremacy: Why Control of the Skies Decides Modern Wars

Not much more than a century ago, the idea of the airplane as a weapon of war would have been regarded as little more than a pipe dream, a nebulous concept that most military strategists couldn't even imagine in any real detail. But just 120 years after the first powered airplane took to the skies, air power has become an indispensable part of warfare. From surveillance to aerial combat to bombardment and logistical transport, the airplane is arguably the most important piece of kit that any modern military can possess. In war after war, control of the skies has equated nearly directly to control over the entire battlefield, and although aircraft, like any technology, can't win a war all by itself, it can certainly get you close.

Key Takeaways

NATO and the US Department of Defense define aerial control on a sliding scale from aerial incapability through parity to full air supremacy, where no enemy aircraft can fly undetected or unchallenged.
The most effective historical method for gaining air supremacy has been destroying enemy aircraft on the ground through pre-emptive strikes on airfields, fuel depots, and runways.
Anthony Fokker's synchronized machine-gun mechanism gave Germany the first effective air-combat capability in World War I, opening the era of the dogfight once the Allies developed a similar system.
During Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe destroyed over four thousand Soviet aircraft within one week, but logistical failures and the Russian winter eventually stripped Germany of air superiority entirely.
In the Korean War, American F-86 Sabres achieved a 10-to-1 kill ratio against Soviet-made MiG-15s, demonstrating that pilot skill remained the decisive dogfighting advantage in the jet age.
Israel seized air supremacy in 1967 by destroying Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian air forces on the tarmac, and in 1982 shot down 85 Syrian planes with zero air-to-air losses.

Defining the Spectrum: From Aerial Incapability to Air Supremacy

Achieving air supremacy first requires defining exactly what it means — specifically, the balance of power that exists between two or more forces in battle. It is important not to constrain the concept to simply planes versus planes, since the situation on land, on the water, or even in space can have a substantive impact on who is winning an aerial battle. The balance of power can be conceptualized along a sliding scale, from worst- to best-case scenarios, as described by NATO and the US Department of Defense. Starting on the bad end is a situation referred to as aerial incapability — where one side of a conflict either can't get their aerial assets in the air, or simply doesn't have aerial assets to fight with. This might be because their planes, helicopters, or drones were destroyed on the tarmac, or, in the case of many insurgent groups, they might not have ever had access to planes at all. A slightly better situation is aerial denial — where even if that side does have planes and helicopters that can take to the sky, it's too dangerous to enter the spaces that matter, be it over a battlefield or a critical asset on the ground. The enemy's own air power is simply too well-concentrated or too dominant to risk engaging. Then there are the neutral situations: an unfavorable balance, parity, and a favorable balance. These are exactly what they sound like. In unfavorably contested airspace, one side is holding its own but really not doing great, and without some change of circumstance, is on track to lose. In a situation of parity, two evenly matched sides exist where nobody holds a real advantage over the other. And in favorably contested airspace, one side is winning and is probably on track to win the overall engagement as long as the enemy doesn't have any unexpected tricks up their sleeve. Then there is the dominant side of the spectrum — the place any aerial commander wants to be. Air superiority is a degree of aerial control strong enough that a combined land, air, and sea force can do what it wants, when it wants, with the enemy being unable to present enough of an aerial threat that any operations would have to be paused. And finally, there is air supremacy: complete control of the skies. Nobody flies without detection, and if there's a plane in the air that shouldn't be flying, it's about to not be flying anymore.

How Air Supremacy Is Achieved: Strikes, Dogfights, and Ground-Based Defenses

Historically speaking, the best way to gain air supremacy isn't a matter of aerial combat, but instead a quick, surgical strike that can eliminate enemy air power while it's still on the ground. Aircraft are a lot easier to hit on the tarmac than they are in the air, and they can't shoot back with any meaningful effect. Alternately, a force can attack the enemy's fuel depots, constraining enemy aircraft to little more than a single flight, even if they're lucky enough to be fueled up when the bombardment takes place. Runways are also a prime target, either so that planes can't take off, or better yet, so that they're stranded in the skies and forced to crash-land. And sabotage, carried out by special-operations forces, can rig an entire enemy airfield with explosives before official hostilities even begin. If air-to-ground attacks fail or aren't feasible, then the aerial balance of power will be decided in pilot-versus-pilot engagements once both sides have planes in the air. Here arise the dogfights and heat-seeking missile chases — grueling battles where aircraft performance, pilot intellect, and limited ammunition make the difference between life and death. Questions of fighter-aircraft sophistication become absolutely central, whether in World War I-style combat between biplanes armed with machine guns, or 21st-century air battles in which a plane could shoot its adversary out of the sky before ever being detected. Those who win these battles can transform contested airspace into air superiority or even supremacy, depending on the scale and scope of their combat successes. Finally, there are the countermeasures a military can take without putting aircraft into the sky at all: surface-to-air missiles, anti-air guns, and electronic weapons, among others. Although the active forces here are stuck on the ground, they can dramatically reduce enemy air power, especially when these defenses can be layered a few kilometers deep into one's own territory, or coordinated between the ships in a naval fleet. In situations where the enemy has already achieved air superiority, ground-to-air measures can level the playing field, and in cases where the enemy attempts a pre-emptive strike on aircraft, ground-to-air weapons are a valuable way to turn the tables or even cripple the enemy's air forces without ever having to launch one's own. No matter how it is achieved, establishing air superiority opens up a whole range of options. Bombers can attack front lines, supply lines, or centers of population and industry. Fighter and attack aircraft can strafe troops on the ground or sink ships. Troop-transport planes can insert land-based forces wherever they want, and valuable munitions, supplies, and personnel can be ferried rapidly around a war zone, unopposed. Reconnaissance planes can venture far behind enemy lines, and massive airfleets can perform fly-overs to intimidate military and political leaders on the other side of a war, using air power not just as an instrument of dominance, but as an instrument of fear.

World War I and the Birth of Aerial Combat

Although powered aircraft had seen limited wartime use as early as 1911, they really came into fashion during World War I, from 1914 to 1918. No military of the period was really ready to fight an air war, or even knew what they were doing in the skies, but they were eventually able to figure it out. First, unarmed reconnaissance planes started appearing over enemy battlefields, and then the other side began to realize they had to send up planes with guns to get those spy planes to go away. Then somebody figured that if you could put a gun on a plane, you could also put a bomb on one, and the first airplane bombardments began. Once all sides entered into combat, innovation happened fast. The first issue was how exactly to fire a machine gun without shooting one's own propellers off — a problem the Germans solved first, when Dutch aircraft designer Anthony Fokker came up with a way to time the firing of a gun so that bullets passed seamlessly through the prop without hitting it. Early in the war, this gave Germany a huge advantage; they were the first to really figure out how to attack enemy aircraft, and their pilots gained invaluable experience attacking aerial targets. But when the Allied forces figured out a similar mechanism, they opened up a whole other dimension of combat: the dogfight. On all sides of the war, individual combat aces became incredibly valuable assets in the sky. A skilled pilot, one who truly had a knack for their aircraft and could gather experience piloting it, could easily take out one, three, or five enemy pilots still trying to get a hang of their new technology. These battles became even more hard-fought when advancements in engine power and maneuverability allowed fighter planes to attack in three dimensions, diving down on their enemy or climbing and turning to avoid someone attacking from behind. Pilots started developing better and better combat tactics, flying in teams or at high speeds or with well-rehearsed maneuvers, and by the late years of the war, they were pulling off truly exceptional combat feats. Planes also became especially dangerous in a ground-attack role, particularly when they could harass a disorganized retreat by the enemy, or strafe an enemy trench in a nice, neat line. So impactful were these airstrikes that by the war's end, ground troops generally wouldn't move much except at night. Aircraft learned to use their range and altitude, too, traveling into the enemy's back lines to destroy high-value targets that ground troops wouldn't be able to reach for months.

Douhet, Mitchell, and the Interwar Case for Air Power

After the war, a few forward-looking theorists were able to see that the importance of air power was only going to grow in future conflicts. The foremost among them was an Italian general named Giulio Douhet, who gave the world a revolutionary new way to conceptualize the value of air power. Informed by the experiences of World War I, where air power had been a meaningful element of battles but was rarely a deciding factor, most military leaders of the early 1920s believed that wars would continue to be settled on land and at sea. But Douhet believed that air power could have real ramifications for the battle on the ground, and that hypothetically speaking, a war between two evenly matched land forces could be decided by air support from one side or the other, rather than in a war of attrition like World War I had been known for. Planes could bomb cities, gain command of a battlefield from the skies, and be used to decide the course of a war, forcing one side to surrender before a ground battle even had to take place. Douhet wasn't necessarily a believer in fighter aircraft on their own merit, but believed that a military force who could use fighter aircraft to clear a path for their bombers would quickly cause their enemy to capitulate. For those familiar with inter-war generals, it should be no surprise that Douhet's colleagues mostly dismissed these ideas out of hand. Across the pond in the United States, a general named Billy Mitchell was hard at work trying to convince his own superiors that air power was the way of the future. As Mitchell saw it, aircraft could subdue centers of industry, terrify troops on the ground, or win dogfights in the skies in order to set up more powerful bombing runs. To prove his point, he carried out live-fire experiments against captured German battleships, where in his first experiment, a small fleet of bombers took less than half an hour to sink one such ship. Unfortunately, Mitchell didn't win many friends for suggesting that the prized American battleship fleet was fallible by a few planes, and he was even court-martialed for his troubles, but his assessments turned out to be well ahead of his time.

World War II: The Luftwaffe, the Battle of Britain, and Operation Barbarossa

By the time World War II came around, the world had a new asset: the monoplane, which boasted far greater performance and the potential for much better firepower than even the most fearsome biplane. Imperial Japan was already showing the value of air power over Chinese forces even before hostilities broke out in Europe, but by and large, Western military doctrine still didn't appreciate the value of aerial-warfare capabilities. The exception was Nazi Germany, which had already gotten its pilots plenty of valuable experience in the Spanish Civil War, and whose air force, the Luftwaffe, was more than able to steamroll Poland, France, and the other targets of the German blitzkrieg in the early years of World War II. But the Luftwaffe was at its best as a close-air-support force, working directly in concert with ground troops to clear out enemy defenses and attack the back lines, with fighter pilots trained to keep their bomber forces protected on short, frequent bombing runs. This worked well — until the Battle of Britain, where the Luftwaffe went head-to-head with British airmen who understood perfectly how to use their geography to their advantage. German air raids over the British Isles required strategic bombers to fly long distances, release their payload, and get home safely, protected by fighter aircraft who could consistently win dogfights without any major loss of personnel or aircraft, night after night. Not only were Luftwaffe pilots largely unequipped for this kind of aerial combat, but they were going up against British Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft, optimized to defend British airspace in high-paced, constant dogfights. The British use of radar to provide early warning, and anti-aircraft guns and radio to help fighters once airborne, provided serious advantages over the Luftwaffe. Although the Luftwaffe facilitated effective bombing raids for much of the conflict, they ran out of planes and qualified pilots much quicker than the British did, and badly overestimated the impact they'd had on the Royal Air Force. In what turned into an aerial war of attrition, British airmen and ground crews increasingly turned their skies into a meat grinder for the Luftwaffe, whose supply-chain issues, lack of heavy bombers, and slow pace of producing replacement aircraft eventually proved too much to overcome. After months of heavy fighting, the British locked down control of their skies, achieving clear air superiority. The losses of the Battle of Britain could not compare to those sustained during Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union — Operation Barbarossa. On the Eastern Front, Hitler's use of air power aligned far closer with what the Luftwaffe had been expecting: a grinding, slow march forward on the ground, from which German fighter planes and light bombers could help force a long series of incremental gains. The Luftwaffe committed four of its five airfleets to the attack, and within one week, they destroyed over four thousand Soviet aircraft in air-to-ground devastation that practically guaranteed air supremacy. However, a combination of logistical issues on the German side, and the introduction of the MiG-3 high-altitude fighter plane and the Il-2 Shturmovik attack aircraft by the Soviet Union's robust manufacturing industry, eventually spelled doom for the Luftwaffe. Much like in the Battle of Britain, lagging supply chains and limited opportunities to repair aircraft took more and more German planes out of the sky, and once the cruel Russian winter set in, that was the end. Many German planes couldn't be started unless fires were set under the engines, and the mechanics' tools had a bad habit of freezing onto their hands. Germany slowly lost their air supremacy, then their air superiority, and then even their parity, until the situation was so badly broken down that the Germans couldn't even sustain an airlift to retreat out of Stalingrad.

The Pacific Theater: Carrier Battles and the Fall of the Zero

The Pacific Theater provided a very different view on aerial warfare, where it was a crucial augmentation to both the Allied and Japanese approach to naval combat throughout the 1940s. Early Japanese successes came on the back of their ability to destroy major numbers of Allied warplanes where they sat on the ground, including America's B-17 bombers in the Philippines and hundreds of aircraft damaged or destroyed in the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the real bulk of aerial engagements came via aircraft-carrier battles and via small fleets of airplanes launched from a range of Pacific islands. Despite Japan's early air superiority, the United States was able to push back at the Battle of the Coral Sea and turned the tide at Midway — both battles where the loss of an aircraft carrier spelled doom for many pilots who now had nowhere to land even if they survived an aerial dogfight. Despite the number of warplanes available to both sides overall, Japan and the Allies could only make use of the planes they could fit onto a carrier, often accompanied by the best pilots of the entire Pacific Theater — meaning that the loss of even a handful of planes and pilots had catastrophic consequences. Japan was also overreliant on the Mitsubishi Zero fighter, which at the start of the war was universally admired and feared for its maneuverability and its capacity to do massive damage. But like all major technological innovations, eventually the Allies developed their own competitor aircraft, and once they did, Japan's Zero fighters were quickly outclassed. By the time the Allies took control of the Philippines and Okinawa, they had secured clear air superiority over the Pacific and could encroach on the Japanese Home Islands. If Imperial Japan had indeed been invaded by land, the Allies would have likely had uncontested control of Japan's airspace, but the United States' decision to drop two nuclear bombs on Japanese cities ended the war before that could happen.

Korea, the Cold War, and the Jet Age

World War II also featured the debut of the jet-powered aircraft, a game-changing piece of technology that would rewrite the rules of aerial engagement. It wasn't long before hostilities kicked off again, this time in Korea, where the US Air Force was caught badly off-guard by a southward advance by the North Korea People's Army. The Air Force's doctrine at the time had called for nearly single-minded investment in long-range, strategic bombers in order to project the threat of nuclear war, but this had an adverse impact in Korea, where there were relatively few targets that required heavy bombers and quite a lot where fast, nimble attack aircraft might have been far more useful. While the US was very successful in conducting air raids on tank columns and supply lines, China's support of the North Koreans provided substantial anti-aircraft artillery and helped North Korean troops better evade American air power. At the same time, American F-86 Sabre fighters began to go head-to-head with Soviet-made MiG-15 jets, especially over southwest Korea. With neither side able to support their pilots very much from the ground, pilot-versus-pilot dogfights were the deciding factor on who controlled the airspace at a given time. Compared to inexperienced North Korean and Chinese pilots, and a small number of covert Soviet pilot units, the American pilots were far superior, informed by their experience in World War II. Despite relatively equal specs and abilities, ten MiG-15 jets would be lost for every American Sabre shot down, proving that pilot skill would remain the most important dogfighting advantage in the jet age. Both sides, especially the United States, learned to excel at taking advantage of controlled airspace to conduct airlifts and supply drops. New helicopters had a massive impact, and the Korean War was a major turning point in learning just what to do with air superiority once it was secured. The technological contests of the Cold War substantively changed the way the world approached aerial combat. In the early 1960s, the world began to reckon with the efficacy of surface-to-air missiles and air-defense radar, prompting tactics such as flying low to the ground to evade enemy radar. Ballistic missiles replaced much of the work of strategic nuclear bombers, and stealth technology changed the game in its own right, culminating with the introduction of the F-22 Raptor. Other planes made big contributions as well: the F-14 Tomcat, the SR-71 Blackbird, the A-10 Warthog, the Harrier jump-jet, and the B-52 bomber for the West, and the Tu-95 bomber and the MiG-21, MiG-31, and Su-27 fighter jets for the Soviets. From Vietnam to the Falklands to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, every conflict of the period forced new innovations and new adaptations in doctrine.

Israel's Air Dominance and Western Intervention from the Gulf War to Kosovo

During these years, Israel proved itself to be exceptionally adept in imposing air supremacy over the Middle East, and often on short notice. This was no accident; Israel's territory is geographically small enough that it could be easily overrun if its Arab neighbors took control of the skies, so much of Israeli defensive doctrine has been centered around protecting its airspace and using air power to cause outsize damage on the ground. In 1967, Israel was able to destroy much of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian Air Forces where their planes sat on the tarmac, seizing air supremacy in just days, and it denied any challenge to its air superiority during wars in 1973 and 1982. In the latter conflict, Israeli fighter aircraft shot down some 85 Syrian planes with no air-to-air losses of Israeli planes. Even today, Israel retains clear air superiority in the Middle East, with dominance bordering on constant air supremacy. In the years during and after the fall of the Soviet Union, Western air superiority has been the linchpin of nearly all intervention efforts. During the 1991 Gulf War, a US-led multinational coalition attained air superiority within just hours of the start of battle, sweeping over Iraq's robust integrated-air-defense system, taking out Iraq's radar and communications, and knocking out centralized command-and-control almost immediately. With this done, the Iraqi Air Force was all but neutralized, and the coalition took no confirmed air-to-air losses during the conflict. During the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, Western powers flew over 38,000 sorties without suffering a single death on NATO's side, and amidst the combined pressure of the threat of ground invasion, these air raids forced a rapid conclusion to the conflict. And in wars between smaller regional powers, acrimonious neighbor countries, or even during civil conflicts, forces that can establish air superiority are, as a rule, very well-equipped to defeat their adversaries.

Syria, Ukraine, and the Contested Skies of the Twenty-First Century

After decades of mostly one-sided air campaigns, the Syrian Civil War provided a fascinating opportunity for world-power air forces to meet on opposite sides of a conflict, even if those major powers did their best not to fight directly. With a Western air-power coalition backing Syria's rebel factions and Russia backing the ruling regime of Bashar al-Assad, both sides' air interventions ran a near-constant risk of falling afoul of the other. Although Syrian airspace has been firmly under the control of nations other than Syria for most of the conflict, both Russia and the Western coalition coordinated closely to avoid any direct confrontations — a situation which prevented either side from gaining air superiority in the region. This unique dynamic, with both sides very clearly dancing around the other, set a precedent for future conflicts in which major powers have conflicting interests in a third country but would rather avoid a wider war. The Russian invasion of Ukraine presents a different picture entirely. The skies over much of Ukraine have been tightly contested. Despite initial expectations that the Russian Air Force's larger, more advanced airfleet would overrun Ukrainian air power in a matter of days, Ukraine has been able to make up the difference using surface-to-air munitions. Although Ukraine's air force has been unable to secure its own airspace or fight head-to-head with Russian pilots, their ground-based defenses have inflicted losses, including dozens of Russian planes and helicopters. Rather than continuing to push vulnerable warplanes into Ukrainian airspace, Russia has instead chosen to pull back and invest in the use of drones and missiles — which Ukraine has responded to by beefing up air defenses and using their own drones and missiles in response. With the help of foreign aid, Ukraine has been able to keep at least some control of its own skies and has outright denied air superiority to Russia. Although the situation remains somewhat favorable to Russia, Ukraine has continued to hold out in something close to a stalemate and has even claimed to shoot down Russia's Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. Ukrainian authorities have been making their case to Western powers, arguing that they should be sent US-made F-16 fighter jets to turn the tides in the air. Western nations have thus far declined these requests rather firmly, not least because these fighters could be used to strike targets deep within Russia — thus giving Russia pretext to further inflame tensions with any nations that supplied the F-16s to Ukraine. But Ukraine has not backed off these requests, and if eventually granted, they could very well hand air superiority — at least temporarily — to Ukraine, leading to a window in which the tide of the entire war might shift.

The Future of Air Supremacy: Stealth, Drones, and Directed Energy

Technological innovation will continue to decide which nations can expect to enter air combat at an advantage or a disadvantage. At times, a nation with a significant-enough technological edge might achieve de-facto air supremacy in future conflicts without firing a shot, with even more advanced stealth systems, directed-energy weapons, drone swarms, and next-generation electronic-warfare capabilities all on the horizon. Many militaries around the world are hard at work developing fifth- and sixth-generation fighter aircraft. Just as important are a nation's ability to sustain its air force, keep its planes and pilots in a fight, and leverage controlled airspace to its fullest extent. Airspace defense and denial will be just as important as the ability to win fights in the air. Nations that can protect their own airspace through surface-to-air weapons, electronic measures, and other ground defenses will continue to have their own advantages, and if those technologies can stay ahead of whatever's in the air, then even the best next-generation aircraft can be made obsolete. What isn't likely to change is just how critical air supremacy will be to the conflicts of the future, just as it's been absolutely central to the conflicts of the last century. The ability to control airspace doesn't necessarily equate to winning a war, but it gets damn close. When two relatively equal sides enter a conflict, the one whose air force can better adapt to the needs of the moment is the one likely to gain massive leverage as time goes on. And when conflicts arise in which one side has a clear aerial advantage, it will be up to the other side to either find some way to fight back or otherwise sue for peace. In the twenty-first century, air supremacy itself reigns supreme, and that isn't likely to change anytime soon.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why can't Ukraine join NATO?

The reasons for Ukraine's inability to join NATO are complex and multifaceted, involving geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and the organization's enlargement process, which requires consensus among existing member states, currently totaling 32, including 30 in Europe and 2 in North America.

What was the significance of Giulio Douhet?

Giulio Douhet, an Italian airpower theorist, was significant for his vision of using bomber aircraft to attack beyond the front lines of battlefields, as outlined in his book 'The Command of the Air', published in the early 20th century, influencing military strategy and the development of airpower doctrine, particularly during World War I, from 1914 to 1918.

What happened to Anthony Fokker?

Anthony Fokker, a Dutch aviation pioneer, played a crucial role in the development of aircraft during World War I, notably with his Fokker Dr.I triplane, which saw action in 1917 and 1918, and after the war, he continued to contribute to aviation advancements, eventually moving to the United States, where he founded the Fokker Aircraft Corporation of America in 1924, before his death in 1939.

What is NATO and what is their purpose?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an intergovernmental military alliance between 32 member states, including 30 in Europe and 2 in North America, aimed at providing collective defense against potential security threats, promoting stability, and fostering cooperation among its members, as outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949.

Is the US in NATO now?

Yes, the United States is one of the founding members of NATO, having signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, and has since played a significant role in the organization, contributing to its military operations, strategic planning, and decision-making processes, alongside other member states, including those in Europe and North America.

Who runs NATO?

NATO is led by a Secretary General, currently Jens Stoltenberg, who serves as the chief administrative officer, and is assisted by a Deputy Secretary General and a team of senior officials, while the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) oversees the military operations, ensuring the alliance's defense and security strategies are implemented effectively, with input from member states, including the US and European countries.

What was the timeline for World War I?

World War I began on July 28, 1914, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, following the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, and lasted until November 11, 1918, when the Armistice of Compiègne was signed, with the Treaty of Versailles officially ending the war on June 28, 1919, marking a six-year period of global conflict and transformation.

Is there a higher level than air supremacy?

Air supremacy represents the highest level of control over the skies, where one side has complete dominance, and the enemy is unable to effectively operate aircraft, as defined by NATO and the US Department of Defense, with air superiority being a lesser degree of control, where one's own side can operate with relative freedom, but the enemy still poses some level of aerial threat, according to the sliding scale of aerial control.