Turkey Threatens Eradication of Kurds in Post-Assad Syria

Discover how Turkey's ultimatum against Kurdish forces in Rojava threatens to ignite a new conflict in post-Assad Syria amidst global disengagement.

Simon Whistler March 4, 2026

On the border between Syria and Turkey, all signs now point to battle. The issue at hand is the long-running animosity between the nation of Turkey, Syria’s northern neighbor, and the ethnic Kurdish population of the Middle East, who have enjoyed functionally autonomous rule in their enclave government of Rojava in northeast Syria for years now. Unlike a range of other bitter tensions in Syria, the standoff between Turkey and Rojava was unlikely to de-escalate simply because Bashar al-Assad was toppled from power, and the reality is very much the opposite. The warning flags in this area have been flying ever since the early-December defeat of the Assad regime in Damascus, but the biggest, brightest red flag to date first flew in early 2025, signaling a highly volatile shift in the region’s security apparatus.

Key Takeaways

Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, declared on January 6, 2025, that the eradication of the Kurdish YPG militia in Syria is imminent.
Recent clashes in January have resulted in over 322 deaths in and around Manbij, highlighting the escalating violence between Kurdish forces and pro-Turkish militias.
Kurdish forces may cede control of key areas, such as Kobani, and have pulled back from guarding Islamic State detention camps to consolidate defenses.
Syria’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, proposed integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into a national army, an initiative sharply opposed by Turkey.
On January 13, Erdogan’s ruling party announced intentions to allow him to run for a fourth term in 2028, signaling a long-term commitment to his current regional policies.

The January Ultimatum and the Campaign Against the YPG

The most severe warning to date first flew on January 6, 2025. On that day, Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, stated that the eradication of a Kurdish militia known as the YPG is “imminent” in Syria, and that Turkey would refuse to agree to any policy in Syria that allowed the YPG to remain. The YPG are, among other things, the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led coalition paramilitary that ensures the security of the Rojava autonomous government, and draws considerable support from the United States and much of Europe. For Turkey, the Syrian Democratic Forces or SDF’s role in stabilizing northern and eastern Syria is dismissed outright, even in the face of a resurgent Islamic State organization that the SDF is essential in combating, but that Turkey denies the existence of, outright. Those January 6 remarks were not exactly a surprise, but a validation of what much of the world feared would happen to the Kurds, now that the situation in Syria had been flipped on its head. After those early remarks, more, and worse, followed behind it. It is unsurprising that Turkey is so dedicated to Kurdish disarmament in Syria. After all, the YPG that Turkey despises is accused of close affiliations with a decades-long Kurdish insurgency in Turkey and Syria, the PKK, that the US, the EU, and most of the Western world considers to be a terrorist organization. The allegations of closeness between the PKK and the YPG are disputed by many of those same Western nations, but for Turkey, the distinction does not seem to matter. Erdogan has indicated clearly, many times, via both rhetoric and military action, that the line Turkey draws between Rojava and the PKK insurgency is drawn in a very different way from the rest of the Western world.

Escalating Skirmishes and the Fight for Tishrin Dam

In the first half of the month of January, dozens of Kurdish fighters and members of pro-Turkey Syrian militias have been killed in a range of clashes and skirmishes, with some estimates suggesting that the death toll is now over one hundred. Kurdish forces have indicated that they may cede areas like the city of Kobani, where they once vowed a staunch defense. They have mostly pulled their troops back from now poorly-defended detention camps for Islamic State fighters, sacrificing those detention camps in order to consolidate their defenses around Kurdish population centers. Turkey has continued a campaign of airstrikes, although those airstrikes are nowhere near as total or as ruinous as they would be, if Turkey chose to engage in an all-out offensive as many fear it will. Conflict has increasingly focused on the key Tishrin Dam, on the river Euphrates in Aleppo province, where pro-Turkish elements are strong, but Kurdish forces maintain control over the dam for now. Amidst accusations by Turkey that they were being used as human shields, Kurdish protesters have gathered in large numbers to call for an end to Turkey’s airstrikes. Those airstrikes risk damaging or even collapsing the dam, which provides essential water and electricity to the region and would risk major flooding downstream if catastrophe struck. At times, fighting around the dam has become heavy. Elsewhere, in and around the city of Manbij, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights—a UK-based war monitor—indicated that at least 322 people have been killed in fighting over the last month. The group’s most recent update showed thirty-seven more people killed since last count, including six SDF fighters, five civilians, and twenty-six pro-Turkish militiamen. The dire situation around the dam and around Manbij underscores a far broader reality of this conflict: that although Kurdish forces are relatively strong for a Syrian fighting faction, and despite their backing from the United States, they are not equipped to stand against a large-scale Turkish military offensive without international support that they are unlikely to get. Incoming US President Donald Trump, still President-Elect at the time of the major escalations, is expected to cede control of this conflict zone to Turkey, even further diminishing the diplomatic cover that the Kurds of Rojava might have otherwise hoped for.

Damascus Caught in the Middle of Turkish Pressure

As a result of their tenuous situation, Kurdish leaders have declined to retaliate at scale against pro-Turkish militias or launch any pre-emptive strike against Turkey. Instead, they are making overtures to the new Syrian government to intervene and establish a ceasefire, and expressing Rojava’s support for “the unity and integrity of Syrian territory”. Syria’s new de-facto leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has called for the Syrian Democratic Forces to be integrated into a new national army, a move that would place them under the protection of Syria’s state legitimacy and make them more difficult for Turkey to attack. But in sharp contrast to the compromises Rojava is working to offer, and perhaps indicating a wider gulf between Syria’s new leaders and Turkey than their prior relationship would lead observers to expect, Turkey has continued to issue calls for all SDF fighters to lay down their arms and for all foreign Kurdish fighters to leave the country. The penalty for non-compliance, according to Turkey, is a full-scale military offensive. That is a promise that Turkey’s Foreign Minister reiterated on January 8, explaining that in regard to Kurdish Rojava, “The ultimatum we gave them through the Americans is obvious.” On January 10, the Turkish government placed pressure on the new Syrian leadership again, with the Foreign Minister suggesting that Damascus should get a chance to “end the occupation and terror that the YPG has created in the region”—again, with ‘YPG’ being synonymous to the armed forces of Kurdish Rojava. The Foreign Minister explained that “we believe that an opportunity needs to be given to them to realize this. We are waiting for this now.” Along with his statements that Turkey would stand aside and wait, expectantly, for Damascus to do something about the problem Turkey perceives in Rojava, the Foreign Minister also made clear that if Damascus failed to take decisive action, Turkey would do the job itself. For Syria’s new leaders, it is an awkward and difficult position to be in. The Kurds have yet to take up arms against them, and are a critical partner in maintaining security in the Syrian heartland, where the Islamic State is at its strongest. But Damascus’ attempts to peacefully integrate the SDF into its military have been rebuffed, not by Rojava, but by Turkey, a much more powerful nation that Syria stands little chance of stopping if it chooses to intervene directly. The situation that Erdogan has laid out for Syria is one in which the new leadership can have the friendship of Rojava, or the friendship of Turkey, but not both.

Geopolitical Implications and Erdogan’s Long Game

Beyond the nation’s long animosity toward Kurdish armed groups, there are real geopolitical incentives for Turkey to dismantle Rojava. The autonomous government oversees vast oil fields in Syria’s northeast, and thus controls a whole lot of money on Turkey’s doorstep that, if kept in-hand by what Turkey perceives as an adversary, would thus be taken out of Ankara’s reach for the long term. Turkey appears to very badly want Damascus to make an enemy of the Kurds, and it is difficult to see how Damascus could justify the risk of making Turkey an enemy by refusing to do Erdogan’s bidding. For now, Turkish President Erdogan seems content to place mounting pressure on the new Syrian government, insisting recently that he expects Syria to actively take part in rooting out the PKK insurgency, and stating: “There is no option left other than to surrender their weapons, abandon terrorism, and dissolve the organization.” While Erdogan was referring to the Turkish insurgent group, the PKK, and not Rojava’s Kurdish YPG militias, regional analysts must take his statements on one as a statement on both. Unfortunately for Kurdish Rojava, and for the new leaders in Damascus, it appears unlikely that anybody is going to come to the rescue. Russia and Iran have disengaged to lick their wounds; the United States appears unwilling to stand behind its Kurdish partners; the European Union is either unable or unwilling to intervene; China is nowhere to be found on the issue; and no other nation of the Middle East has the combination of political incentive and diplomatic clout to make a difference. In Turkey, any prospect of political change is currently slim. On January 13, a Turkish spokesman of Erdogan’s ruling party indicated that the party intends to see to it that Erdogan can run for a fourth term in office in 2028. Erdogan has been in power since 2014, he has benefited from constitutional amendments to significantly broaden his authority, and he is likely to be successful in extending his mandate by overwriting the current guardrails around Turkey’s high executive. In Erdogan’s Turkey, a constitutional amendment to extend his personal time in office is unlikely to fail when push comes to shove. If Erdogan does push his amendment through, then Syria’s Kurds should expect to settle in, and start thinking about the long game. Erdogan will not be replaced, he will not be deterred, and right now, it appears highly unlikely that he would allow Rojava to continue to exist.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did Turkey support Bashar al-Assad?

Turkey’s support for Bashar al-Assad is not explicitly stated, but according to Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister, his efforts were focused on persuading Assad to flee Damascus, which suggests that Turkey was not in support of Assad’s regime, at least not by January 2025, when Fidan made his remarks about the imminent eradication of the YPG militia in Syria.

What is the conflict between Kurds and Turkey?

The conflict between Kurds and Turkey stems from the long-running animosity between the nation of Turkey and the ethnic Kurdish population of the Middle East, who have enjoyed functionally autonomous rule in their enclave government of Rojava in northeast Syria for years now, with Turkey threatening to launch a military operation against Kurdish forces in Syria unless they accept Ankara’s conditions for a “bloodless” transition.

Do Kurds in Turkey want independence?

While the transcript excerpt does not explicitly state that Kurds in Turkey want independence, it mentions that the Kurdish population has enjoyed functionally autonomous rule in their enclave government of Rojava in northeast Syria, suggesting that they value a degree of autonomy or self-governance, and Turkey’s threat to launch a military operation against them implies that their desire for autonomy is not accepted by Turkey.

Why are Kurds fighting in Syria?

Kurds are fighting in Syria as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition paramilitary that ensures the security of the Rojava autonomous government, and draws considerable support from the US and much of Europe, with the goal of stabilizing northern and eastern Syria and combating the resurgent Islamic State organization.

Who does the US support in Syria?

The US supports the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition paramilitary, as well as the YPG militia, which is the armed wing of the Syrian-based Democratic Union Party (PYD), with the US providing them with considerable backing, although incoming US President Donald Trump is expected to cede control of this conflict zone to Turkey.

Are the Syrian rebels Shia or Sunni?

The transcript excerpt does not explicitly state the sectarian affiliation of the Syrian rebels, but it mentions that the conflict in Syria involves various factions, including the Kurdish-led SDF and pro-Turkish militias, without providing information on their religious affiliations, although it is widely known that the Syrian conflict involves both Sunni and Shia groups.

Does the US support YPG?

Yes, the US supports the YPG, with the transcript excerpt stating that the YPG is a US-backed Kurdish militant group in Syria, and the YPG being the armed wing of the Syrian-based Democratic Union Party (PYD), which receives considerable support from the US and much of Europe.

Who is the YPG fighting?

The YPG is fighting against pro-Turkish militias and elements in Syria, as well as the Islamic State organization, with the goal of stabilizing northern and eastern Syria and maintaining control over the Rojava autonomous government, and has been involved in clashes and skirmishes with these groups, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries.

Key Takeaways

The January Ultimatum and the Campaign Against the YPG

Escalating Skirmishes and the Fight for Tishrin Dam

Damascus Caught in the Middle of Turkish Pressure

Geopolitical Implications and Erdogan’s Long Game

Frequently Asked Questions

Did Turkey support Bashar al-Assad?

What is the conflict between Kurds and Turkey?

Do Kurds in Turkey want independence?

Why are Kurds fighting in Syria?

Who does the US support in Syria?

Are the Syrian rebels Shia or Sunni?

Does the US support YPG?

Who is the YPG fighting?

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Sources

Frequently Asked Questions