The Syrian Civil War: A Downward Spiral to Madness

It was the defining global conflict of the 2010s, the tragic culmination of what was once called the Arab Spring, and even today, it is one of the most horrific ongoing conflicts on the planet. Since it began in 2011, the Syrian Civil War has been a bloody war of attrition and a desperate attempt to oust President Bashar al-Assad from power. In that time, the war has played host to the rise and fall of a long list of rebel organizations and independence movements. It has seen the Islamic State come and go, and return again. And it has been a focal point for the world’s major powers, the main players of the Middle East, and a very long list of non-Syrian fighters, all seeking to turn the situation to their own advantage in some way or another. Through the entire conflict, it has been the Syrian people who have suffered most. From revolution, to war zone, to caliphate, to pandemonium—this is the story of the Syrian Civil War.

Key Takeaways

• Hafez al-Assad’s 1982 massacre of 25,000 people in Hama suppressed opposition for decades but planted deep seeds of resentment that fueled the 2011 uprising.
• The Free Syrian Army, formed on July 29, 2011, was too factional to serve as a unified rebel force, functioning more as a patchwork of independent militias than a cohesive army.
• A government massacre of 108 people including 34 women and 49 children in late May 2012 destroyed the UN ceasefire effort and galvanized rebel unification.
• ISIS emerged in April 2013 and by summer 2014 had seized cities including Raqqa and Dabiq, massive military hardware, and oil fields across eastern Syria and western Iraq.
• Russia’s September 2015 entry into the conflict transformed the civil war into a proxy war, bombing both ISIS and anti-Assad rebels while enabling the regime’s recapture of Aleppo by end of 2016.
• The US-backed Kurdish capture of Raqqa in 2017 broke the back of ISIS territorial control but left a power vacuum that Turkey exploited against Kurdish forces.

The Assad Dynasty and the Conditions for Revolution

Since 1970, Syria has been under the continual control of one family, the Assads, whose original patriarch, Hafez al-Assad, orchestrated a coup against a military junta which, just a few years earlier, he had helped get into power via a different coup. Hafez al-Assad was a member of Syria’s Alawi minority of Shi’a Muslims, and he installed Alawite leaders at many of Syria’s bureaucratic levers of power, turning the country into a one-party dictatorship. This came with a lot of things—a personality cult for the Assads, strong ties with the Soviets, and most important of all, public discontent. Hafez al-Assad’s biggest crackdown against his opposition was done with overwhelming force, in the city of Hama in 1982, where Assad’s military slaughtered 25,000 people in response to a Muslim Brotherhood uprising. This harsh response ensured that Syrians were unlikely to participate in many further uprisings during Hafez al-Assad’s rule, but it planted seeds of resentment toward the regime that would only grow with time. Over the following decades, Hafez, and later his son and successor, Bashar al-Assad, oversaw the transformation of Syria into a patronage system. Under the Assads, Syria’s social structure morphed to facilitate a one-way flow of revenue toward the elite, in a pattern that was not unique in the Middle East during the 1990s and 2000s. But this all came to a head in 2011, when a series of protests in Tunisia inspired citizens in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and elsewhere to begin pushing back against their own authoritarian leaders. With the help of social media and widely available Internet access, this series of protests quickly morphed into the Arab Spring. Every nation in the Middle East and Northern Africa would have at least some level of internal reckoning during the Arab Spring, with the savviest leaders able to placate their population by carrying out reforms, and the rest caught off-guard as decades of festering animosity were finally brought out in the open.

From Protest to Armed Uprising: The Outbreak of War

The first major protests began in Syria on March 15, 2011, a few days after a group of teenagers were arrested in the city of Deraa for creating graffiti that denounced President Bashar al-Assad, reading: “The people want the fall of the regime.” Inspired by the progress that protesters in other nations had already been able to achieve, Syrians took to the streets, demanding democratic reforms in their government. There were plenty of reasons to protest; a series of reforms that Bashar al-Assad had promised a decade earlier had never come, and a years-long drought had pushed many Syrians into poverty or forced them to leave the countryside. Within weeks, the protests had spread across Syria, but just like in Hama decades before, the crackdowns were coming. On April 9, dozens of people were killed during demonstrations; on April 25, tanks were deployed to the streets. Three days later, hundreds of people would die, and numerous Assad party elites resigned from their posts in protest, but it would make no difference. By this time, the Syrian Army wasn’t just firing on unarmed protesters in the streets. Their tactics had evolved to include arbitrary detention of men and boys, the liberal use of torture as a tool for either interrogation or punishment, and extrajudicial execution. In order to try and force protesters to capitulate, the Assad regime shut down supplies of food, water, electricity, and medicine, while offering minor concessions, but at the same time continuing to allow soldiers to fire on protestors. Rather than forcing civilians to accept the will of the regime, these decisions had the opposite effect; the protestors took up arms, and when they returned to the streets, they were prepared to defend their right to organize. Individual cities began to plan and coordinate among their citizens, and then cities and communities began working together, and before long, the people of Syria had laid the groundwork for revolution. At the same time, parts of the Syrian Army began to abandon Assad, and although they wouldn’t defect in large enough numbers to cripple the regime itself, they ensured that the population had not just the will, but the knowledge to fight back. The Free Syrian Army was formed on July 29, 2011, made up primarily of army deserters who were unwilling to fire upon their own people. These troops were likely to have been shot themselves if they had refused to follow orders, so caught between a rock and a hard place, they chose instead to form an option where protestors could take up arms too. Parallel to the Free Syrian Army, the civilian Syrian National Coalition was also founded during summer 2011, with the express purpose of representing the interests of the Syrian people abroad. The National Coalition quickly gained recognition from the US, Turkey, and several critical regional allies.

A Fractured Opposition and the Siege of Homs

Recognition alone was not enough to win a war, and with the opposition at a severe strategic and tactical disadvantage to the regime, they were unable to consolidate themselves quickly enough to turn the tide. The Free Syrian Army had a difficult time coordinating its own operations, and it was deeply factional from the start, more a union of military deserters and a patchwork of Syrian militias than a true, cohesive army. The National Coalition likewise had a difficult time securing any material support for the opposition, and even within Syria, enough opposition groups simply ignored the National Coalition that it quickly became impotent. As a result, even if Syria’s armed rebels agreed in principle that a unified front would be helpful in beating Assad, they had little incentive to actually stick with the Free Syrian Army. By now, the Assad regime had been accused by the UN of carrying out massacres and assassinations, using death squads, and committing other crimes against humanity, but the strength of this international opposition wasn’t quite enough to get substantial material resources or war-fighting equipment headed into Syria. The rebels had also been forced to retreat from the town of al-Rastan after a week of intense fighting, one in which things immediately got real for the Free Syrian Army in a way that far outstripped anything they had experienced before. Even though the rebels were later able to take control of the city of Idlib, that success was too little, too late. The so-called Free Syrian Army would continue to be a recognizable name internationally, but functionally speaking, it had become a slapdash assortment of mostly independent independence movements. It was around this time, at the end of 2011, that the early phase of the war began to concentrate around the city of Homs. A rebel brigade had been able to take control of a neighborhood within the city, and while most militias in most places had been forced to give up the territory they controlled when government forces counterattacked, the situation in Homs was different. Despite intense artillery shelling, that neighborhood of Homs was able to hold out from late October until early March. During these months, both sides ratcheted up the pressure; rebel forces were able to attack high-value intelligence and military targets, while the Assad regime turned to the large-scale use of artillery shelling and tanks, including in civilian areas. Internationally, Russia and Iran both confirmed their long-standing support of Assad, with Russia vetoing any attempts by the UN Security Council to step in. Across the world, the US and the European Union joined a coalition of Middle Eastern nations calling for al-Assad to step down, but attempted interventions by the Arab League and the UN both failed spectacularly.

Al-Nusra, the Collapse of Ceasefires, and the Battle for Aleppo

2012 heralded a few substantive changes in the war, not least the entry of a new faction: Jabhat al-Nusra, a Sunni Islamist movement representing itself as the al-Qaeda organization’s franchise within Syria. Al-Qaeda, and other jihadist movements, had already been hard at work taking advantage of the chaos of the Arab Spring, but by this time, Syria was by far the clearest candidate for them to set up shop. Al-Qaeda’s spiritual leader at the time, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called for a jihad in Syria to fight against the regime, and when Jabhat al-Nusra proved itself capable of achieving some fairly major battlefield successes, it became a real option for many defected soldiers and foreign recruits who had needed a flag to rally behind. By this time, the city of Homs had eventually been forced to capitulate, and so had the city of Idlib, where some ten thousand people were believed to have died during brutal fighting. The Assad regime had turned to the use of attack helicopters and other particularly lethal measures, while the UN-brokered ceasefire was in the process of being manipulated to paint a more positive picture of the regime. A government massacre of 108 people, including 34 women and 49 children, in late May of 2012 was the final nail in the coffin of the UN peace effort. It was also the final straw for the various Syrian rebel organizations, who issued an ultimatum to the government and finally appeared to unify under the Free Syrian Army banner. Al-Assad, predictably, responded with yet another commitment to crush the uprising, and when the UN’s ceasefire broke, it shattered. Within weeks, the world began to recognize the Syrian crisis for what it was: not a rebellion, not a resistance, but a civil war. Civil protests in the capital city of Damascus and the major city of Aleppo led to more and more discontent inside the cities themselves, which had, thus far, stayed mostly quiet, and in the countryside, the rebels were starting to have more and more success. The city of Al-Qusayr fell, then the town of Saraqib, and by mid-July, rebel forces were in position to make a major push on Damascus. The Syrian defense minister, one of his predecessors, Bashar al-Assad’s own brother-in-law, and the head of Syrian intelligence were all killed in a suicide bombing, and fighting began to pick up in Aleppo as well. The Assad regime escalated yet again and began to dispatch fighter jets in Aleppo and Damascus, pushing the fighting in Damascus to the outskirts of the city. But by now, Aleppo was cornered by rebel forces, who had also seized valuable border checkpoints shared with Iraq and Turkey. These allowed the rebels to facilitate the flow of foreign fighters inward and get their own people across the border when necessary, and it also brought a whole new player into the conflict: Kurdistan.

Kurdish Forces and the Rebel Advance of Late 2012

Kurdistan is an unrecognized international entity—and practically speaking, it could be described as a nation, just without sovereign-state status. It is made up of the Middle East’s Kurdish minority, a people with a long history of organized, fierce resistance in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. With the Kurdish diaspora free to enter Syria from two of those other three nations, they were able to form their own well-armed paramilitary groups in northern Syria. In the autumn and winter of 2012, rebel forces took more and more territory in the north, even as al-Assad’s jet fighters began a bombing campaign on the outskirts of Damascus. In a weeks-long battle, the rebels took control of a major military base outside Aleppo, and then another in the eastern province of Deir ez-Zor. This was a critical equalizer between the two sides, as the rebels were able to take control of some seriously heavy-duty equipment. Islamist groups, including the al-Nusra Front, took control of their own military base and quickly began taking territory of their own. Shortly after, another airbase fell to the Free Syrian Army. The FSA captured the city and provincial capital of Raqqa in March of 2013, and then more military bases, while in the northeast region, Kurdish forces took command of the area’s oil fields. By this time, much of Syria was entirely outside the reach of the Assad regime, and it seemed, at least from the outside, that the rebels were only getting stronger. It should be noted that as righteous as the cause of the rebels may have been, the Syrian Civil War had already gotten very dark. All sides involved, not just the regime, had perpetrated significant human-rights violations, and the advent of modern smartphones meant that video could be easily recorded and uploaded from all across the warzone. In one particularly stunning incident, a rebel commander was filmed eating the heart and liver of a dead Syrian Army soldier. No amount of horrific acts by the rebels could excuse the horrific acts of the regime—just by one example, the regime decided to deploy chemical weapons in the same year. But by early 2013, there was some truly nasty stuff going on all across Syria.

The Rise of the Islamic State

In April 2013, a new player emerged that would eventually make every other faction look tame in comparison. Their name, roughly translated to English, was the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—better known as ISIS. Almost immediately, ISIS adopted a level of brutality that has rarely been seen in the modern era, and they used a clear social-media savvy to broadcast those heinous acts worldwide. Not only did ISIS gain significant support from jihadist hardliners in Syria, but it also attracted thousands upon thousands of foreign fighters to its ranks. Within just months, ISIS forces exploded through eastern Syria and western Iraq, taking over cities, as well as large swathes of functionally empty territory—but territory that was badly needed for both government and rebel supply chains. The early summer months of 2013 saw the regime and the Free Syrian Army each take and lose significant territory, with the government getting the better of those exchanges. But by the end of June, the addition of ISIS had turned the conflict into pure chaos. ISIS, the regime, the pro-democracy rebels, the other jihadist groups, the Islamists, and the Kurds were all fighting each other, each clinging onto whatever territory they could, and indiscriminate massacres of civilians became an increasingly common tool on every side. Autumn and winter were more of the same, with all sides at war, but the Islamic State taking advantage of the situation more effectively than any of the others. They were able to take and hold the city of Raqqa, despite the best attempts of rebel fighters to force them out, and made the city into a home base for their operations in Syria. But ISIS wouldn’t really explode until the summer of 2014, when the group expanded rapidly outward in Iraq and seized massive amounts of military hardware, before taking command of oil fields and weathering heavy counterattacks from the Syrian and Iraqi militaries. ISIS claimed a number of cities that summer, including the city of Dabiq, which is central to ISIS’ own apocalyptic beliefs about a final battle with the West. In a more practical sense, ISIS also captured an important airbase and executed the American journalist James Foley, well and truly putting themselves on the West’s radar.

The Foreign War: Western Airstrikes and Russian Intervention

The US and Europe were strongly opposed to the idea of such an outright insane group as ISIS being able to plot global acts of terrorism. A US-led coalition began a campaign of airstrikes against ISIS in September of 2014, using fighter and bomber aircraft, and Predator drones. With the US and their coalition now active in the area, they had to make the hard decision of which side, which groups, to warn before an airstrike was coming, and for the most part, they chose to give that forewarning to pro-democracy rebels and Kurdish militias, while being careful to try not to attack the Syrian Army. During the first months of the bombing campaign, ISIS was very nearly able to take the city of Kobani, but a combined counteroffensive by Kurdish troops and coalition air power drove them out. The entry of the West into the war changed the situation on the ground in a number of ways. New factions of rebels, most prominently the Southern Front, were able to take new territory from the Assad regime, while another faction, the so-called Army of Conquest, took large portions of the heavily contested Idlib Province. In the following summer, ISIS tried to advance again, seizing and destroying the ancient city of Palmyra, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, while carrying out yet more massacres. ISIS was successful in taking limited amounts of territory from the Assad regime, but was forced to wilt again under a constant barrage of airstrikes. In September 2015, Russia entered the conflict at the request of Bashar al-Assad, and while they lent their air power to bombardment of Islamic State targets, they also had no qualms about bombing any anti-Assad rebels they could find. That included the remains of the Free Syrian Army, which by now was looking less and less like a unified front, as evidenced by the US’ parallel announcement that their public program to train and equip Syrian rebels had been a failure. Covert programs were still ongoing, but on the world stage, this failure was still a massive boost to the Assad regime. This is about when the war in Syria began to turn from a true civil war to a proxy war, and with foreign weapons, money, and equipment flooding in from all sides, none of the forces on the ground had much incentive to think about peace. A number of foreign powers did publicly work toward a peace deal at this time, but with Assad and the rebels both believing they had the foreign support to win in battle, peace was obviously not forthcoming. Dual terror attacks by ISIS, one targeting a Russian plane while the other targeted the city of Paris, just intensified the ferocity of the airstrikes launched by both sides. By the end of 2015, Russia and Iran were bent on supporting al-Assad, the US and the EU were bent on getting him out of power, and every force on the ground was bent on victory.

The Regime Resurgent: Aleppo, Turkey, and the Decline of ISIS

2016 was a year for the Assad regime, first with a bold territorial push backed up by Russia and Iran, then taking advantage of a months-long ceasefire to consolidate their position, then liberating Palmyra from ISIS, and then recapturing the city of Aleppo by the end of the year. Aleppo had been the focus of some of the most brutal fighting of the entire war, and the city was all but leveled by the time Assad’s forces took it back. In the process, they had resorted to indiscriminate bombings of medical facilities, aid workers, and known civilian areas. But despite humanitarian outrage, Aleppo was one of Syria’s most populous cities, and its capture was a major victory for the regime. Also in 2016, Turkey invaded territory in Northern Syria, some of which was held by ISIS, and some of which was held by Kurdish forces. Although to a Western eye those two groups are very different, Turkey has treated its Kurdish population as a terrorist force for decades, and things were no different in Syria, where they took control of the city of Jarabalus and advanced southward. In the face of foreign pressure, Turkey was convinced to turn its attention elsewhere and focus on the battle with ISIS, but the nation had quite clearly inserted itself as a third foreign sponsor of the conflict. 2017 saw ISIS severely diminished in Syria, as its three-year-long siege of the city of Deir ez-Zor was finally broken by the Assad regime, and its de-facto capital city, Raqqa, was taken over by US-backed Kurdish forces. This essentially broke the back of the ISIS offensive, which has not been able to secure any comparable degree of territorial control for the rest of the war. With ISIS all but eliminated, the US and its coalition had only limited pretext to remain in the area, and despite ongoing Turkish offensives against the Kurds in the north, the US found itself more diplomatically embroiled with Russia, which was trying to encourage the US to pack up and go home. This situation changed quickly in April of 2018, when a chemical attack, reported to include the use of chlorine and sarin gas, was allegedly carried out by the Syrian government. Assad’s regime had used chemical weapons in 2017 too, and this repeated offense was met with missile strikes on the regime by the US, France, and the UK, but even in that critical moment, when the Syrian Civil War appeared to be on the edge of growing into a far larger conflict, the West ultimately chose not to send troops to intervene directly.

Fragile Ceasefires and the Emergence of Tahrir al-Sham

During the rest of 2018, the Assad regime and some, although not all, Kurdish factions were able to negotiate toward peace. As they did so, the regime, the Western coalition, and the rebels all pitched in toward mopping up the last concentrated bits of ISIS resistance. But it was Israel that complicated the situation badly, by launching airstrikes against Iranian targets in May, and causing an incident in September which ended when Syrian forces mistakenly shot down a Russian plane. This latest geopolitical near-miss was enough to get Russian, Turkish, and European leaders to collaborate toward drawing down international involvement in Syria as a whole, something which the United States contributed to by beginning plans to withdraw from Syria entirely. As the conflict crossed into 2019, a new faction, a Sunni Islamist faction known as Tahrir al-Sham, defeated and then took control of a major anti-Assad rebel group, opening up a new front of battle against the regime. ISIS continued to attack targets as best they could, now operating in a far more decentralized manner than before, and Turkey continued aggressing into northeastern Syria, taking advantage of the power vacuum the United States had left behind by functionally abandoning its Kurdish allies. But by and large, 2019 was an opportunity for many sides to begin stepping back, setting up demilitarized zones and ceasefires, and taking stock of what had been lost during the war. The Kurds aligned themselves with the regime and its Russian sponsor in order to try and slow the advance of Turkey, and Russia effectively stepped into the vacuum the US had left. In the face of this united opposition, as well as increasing pressure from its allies in NATO, Turkey agreed to a buffer zone between itself and most of the Kurdish-majority parts of Syria. Seeing this success, most other Kurdish militias chose to put aside their differences and agree to maintain the buffer zone, and with most of the country now under either regime or Kurdish control, Syria was able to turn its attention toward reconstruction, aided by Russia, China, and several regional allies.

A Humanitarian Catastrophe and an Uncertain Future

In 2020 and beyond, the Assad regime has continued to push toward northwestern Syria, where pro-democracy rebels continue to hold out, mostly in and around Syria’s Idlib province. But these battle lines have settled down quite a bit, with the regime tolerating rebel groups’ autonomy, at least for the most part, and the rebels now lacking any substantial ability to push southward and win an offensive. Skirmishes are still common, but the war between Assad and the explicitly anti-regime rebels has become a low-grade conflict. ISIS is now no more present in Syria than it is across much of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. In the northeast, Turkey still continues limited attacks against specific Kurdish militias, which have been accused of ethnic cleansing against their local Arab population. At present, rebel forces and the Islamist group Tahrir al-Sham each control some territory in the northwestern corner of Syria. The Islamic State holds isolated pockets of mostly empty desert, while Kurdish forces claim massive amounts of territory along the Syrian northeast. By and large, most of the rest of the country, including the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs, are under the control of Bashar al-Assad, and as it stands, Assad’s forces appear to be in position to consolidate control over anti-regime areas eventually. But what this balance of power leaves out is the humanitarian crisis that Syria finds itself dealing with. In 2022, the UN estimated that about 15 million people in Syria were in need of humanitarian assistance, a situation that hasn’t gotten substantively better with time. Over half of Syria’s pre-war population are displaced, with nearly seven million still in Syria and almost as many living abroad as refugees, mostly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. According to the UN, twelve million Syrians are living meal-to-meal, with runaway inflation, fuel shortages, and a cholera outbreak making the problem that much worse. Much of the country is made up of ruins, including many buildings that were once hospitals and schools, and for which there have been no replacements. Syria’s cultural heritage is functionally reduced to nothing, the Islamic State and other terrorist groups are still active, and over the full scope of the conflict, a minimum of 300,000 civilians have been caught in the crossfire. In all, most estimates place the death toll of the Syrian Civil War at or above half a million people, although it is entirely likely that even that number is an under-count. In the words of the UN’s Human Rights Office, “parties to the conflict have cumulatively committed almost every crime against humanity… and nearly every war crime applicable in a non-international armed conflict.” With such a devastating, seemingly endless war looking as if it might finally wind down, any peaceful resolution will have to involve the agreement of many world powers, all hostile to each other. Above all, the focus must be placed squarely on the Syrian people, a nation of tens of millions of innocents who did not ask for war. After twelve years of war, after the devastation of their homes and cities, the perversion and polarization of their neighbors and families, and the loss of far too many loved ones, the Syrian people have exceptionally little to show for their suffering. Unless something massive changes, the Assad regime will be the winner in this war, and many of the perpetrators of the war’s most heinous acts are likely to go free without repercussion. Even now, Arab nations have reached out an olive branch to Assad, seeming to accept that he will remain Syria’s dictator indefinitely.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war?

The Arab Spring was a wave of pro-democracy protests that swept through the Middle East and North Africa, including Syria, in 2011. The Syrian civil war began in March 2011, when popular discontent with the Ba’athist regime ruled by President Bashar al-Assad led to widespread protests, which were met with violent crackdowns by the government, eventually escalating into a full-blown civil war. The conflict has been ongoing for over a decade, resulting in one of the worst humanitarian crises in modern history. By 2012, the Syrian National Coalition and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) had formed to oppose the Assad regime. The war has caused immense suffering, with millions of Syrians displaced and thousands killed.

What was the main cause of the Syrian civil war?

The main cause of the Syrian civil war was the popular discontent with the Ba’athist regime ruled by President Bashar al-Assad, which had been in power since 1970. The regime’s authoritarian nature, corruption, and failure to implement democratic reforms led to widespread protests in 2011, which were violently suppressed by the government, eventually escalating into a civil war. The regime’s actions, including the arrest of teenagers for creating anti-Assad graffiti in Deraa on March 15, 2011, and the subsequent crackdown on protests, further fueled the conflict. By April 2011, the protests had spread across Syria, and the regime’s response had become increasingly violent.

What side of the Syrian civil war does the US support?

The US has supported the opposition forces in Syria, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian National Coalition, in their efforts to oust President Bashar al-Assad from power. The US has provided military aid and training to these groups, as well as imposed economic sanctions on the Assad regime. However, the US has not provided direct military intervention in the conflict, instead relying on a combination of diplomatic and economic pressure to try to bring an end to the war. In 2014, the US began conducting airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Syria, and has continued to provide support to Kurdish and Arab forces fighting against IS.

What caused the Syrian civil war in 2011?

The Syrian civil war was caused by a combination of factors, including the arrest of teenagers for creating anti-Assad graffiti in Deraa on March 15, 2011, and the subsequent crackdown on protests by the Assad regime. The protests, which began in response to the arrests, quickly spread across Syria, with demonstrators demanding democratic reforms and an end to the regime’s authoritarian rule. The regime’s violent response to the protests, including the use of tanks, artillery, and sniper fire, further fueled the conflict, eventually leading to the formation of opposition groups, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and the escalation of the war. By April 2011, the conflict had become a full-blown civil war, with the regime facing opposition from a range of groups, including the FSA and the Syrian National Coalition.

What did Hafez al-Assad do to Syria?

Hafez al-Assad, who ruled Syria from 1970 until his death in 2000, installed a one-party dictatorship, with the Ba’ath Party holding complete control over the government and economy. He also established a personality cult, with himself as the central figure, and promoted the interests of the Alawite minority, to which he belonged, over those of other groups in Syria. In 1982, Hafez al-Assad oversaw a brutal crackdown on a Muslim Brotherhood uprising in the city of Hama, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 25,000 people. This event had a profound impact on Syrian society, creating a climate of fear and repression that continued under his son and successor, Bashar al-Assad. Hafez al-Assad’s rule also saw the transformation of Syria into a patronage system, with the regime using its control over the economy to reward its supporters and punish its opponents.

Who is Bashar al-Assad and how did he rule Syria?

Bashar al-Assad is the son of Hafez al-Assad and has been the President of Syria since 2000. He inherited a regime that was already authoritarian and repressive, and has continued to rule Syria in a similar manner. Bashar al-Assad has maintained the personality cult established by his father, and has promoted the interests of the Alawite minority over those of other groups in Syria. He has also overseen a series of brutal crackdowns on opposition groups, including the 2011 uprising that eventually escalated into the Syrian civil war. Under Bashar al-Assad’s rule, Syria has become increasingly isolated internationally, with many countries imposing economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation in response to his regime’s human rights abuses. In 2011, he was elected president by a referendum in which he ran unopposed, officially garnering 97% of the vote.

Why are US troops in Syria now?

US troops are in Syria as part of a broader effort to defeat the Islamic State (IS) and to support Kurdish and Arab forces fighting against IS. The US has been conducting airstrikes against IS targets in Syria since 2014, and has also provided military aid and training to opposition groups, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In 2019, the US announced that it would be maintaining a military presence in Syria, despite earlier plans to withdraw, in order to continue the fight against IS and to support the SDF. The US has also expressed concerns about the potential for Iran to expand its influence in Syria, and has sought to counter Iranian-backed militias operating in the country. As of 2022, there are approximately 900 US troops deployed in Syria, primarily in the northeastern part of the country.

Was Hafez al-Assad a good president?

Hafez al-Assad’s presidency was marked by authoritarianism, repression, and human rights abuses, making it difficult to characterize him as a ‘good’ president. His rule was marked by a series of brutal crackdowns on opposition groups, including the 1982 Hama massacre, which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 25,000 people. He also established a one-party dictatorship, with the Ba’ath Party holding complete control over the government and economy, and promoted the interests of the Alawite minority over those of other groups in Syria. While Hafez al-Assad did implement some economic and social reforms during his rule, his legacy is largely defined by his authoritarianism and repression. His son and successor, Bashar al-Assad, has continued to rule Syria in a similar manner, leading to widespread criticism and condemnation from the international community.

Related Coverage

• Bashar Al-Assad: The Rise and Fall of Syria’s Brutal Tyrant
• ISIS Killed Three Americans in Syria: Inside the Islamic State’s Dangerous Resurgence
• The Libyan Civil Wars: Quagmire in a Quagmire
• The Fall of America’s Kurdish Alliance: Syrian Democratic Forces Collapse
• Bloodshed in Syria. Here’s What We Know.

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15. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/15/twelve-years-on-from-the-beginning-of-syrias-war
16. https://www.npr.org/2021/03/15/976352794/syrias-civil-war-started-a-decade-ago-heres-where-it-stands
17. https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/current-situation-syria
18. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE115.html
19. https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/report-syria/