Sudan: The Proxy War the World Is Ignoring

It is one of the biggest crises in the world. A sprawling civil war that has destroyed cities, killed a bare minimum of 13,000, and displaced more people than any other conflict on Earth. Yet browse the headlines on an average day, and there is nothing about the war in Sudan. Even as ethnic cleansing sweeps Darfur, even as millions of people slip towards starvation, large swathes of the media remain largely silent — happy to relegate the Sudan War to second-tier status, below the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. The reasons range from the war’s sheer complexity to the lack of any faction to root for. But this is a crisis everyone should be paying attention to. Not just for humanitarian reasons, but for its ability to suck in multiple world powers. Right now, the list of nations being dragged into Sudan’s proxy war is spectacular: Iran, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. All these countries and more are vying for power on Sudan’s battlefields. Who succeeds could determine the course of geopolitics for decades to come.

Key Takeaways

• Over 8 million people have been displaced by the Sudan civil war since April 15, 2023 — more than in Syria or Ukraine — and 25 million need humanitarian assistance.
• The UAE is accused by a leaked UN Security Council document of smuggling arms to the RSF through Chad under the cover of humanitarian aid flights.
• Iran began delivering Mohajer 6 drones to SAF-controlled Port Sudan in January 2024, enabling the SAF’s breakthrough assault on Omdurman.
• The Wagner Group supplies the RSF with surface-to-air missiles in exchange for access to Sudan’s gold mines, while Ukrainian special forces partner with the SAF to hunt Wagner mercenaries.
• Iran is pressing General al-Burhan for permission to build a permanent naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, potentially shifting the regional balance of power.
• A major oil pipeline rupture in February 2024 cut off critical revenue for South Sudan, which derives 90 percent of its income from oil sales pumped through Sudanese territory.

A Year in Hell: Sudan’s Staggering Humanitarian Catastrophe

In the year since civil war erupted in Sudan on April 15, 2023, the 45 million inhabitants of this vast African nation have experienced hardship on a staggering scale. The UN estimates over 8 million people have been displaced by the fighting — far more than even in Syria or Ukraine. About 25 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, while the International Rescue Committee estimates that seven million could be on the brink of famine. Across the country, whole cities have been destroyed. The capital Khartoum and the largest city Omdurman have been reduced to hollow wrecks. In the west, wild looting and arson has devastated El Geneina. Officially, the UN death toll stands at “over 13,000,” but almost everyone believes that is an undercount. The fighting and subsequent anarchy in El Geneina alone may have ended 10,000 lives, and the city may not even be the worst hit. In short, the war is an ongoing disaster — one UN officials have described as “one of the worst humanitarian nightmares in recent history.” The conflict seems to be having roughly zero impact on the world stage. This is not just the case in America and Europe. The collective West is more preoccupied with Ukraine and Gaza, and things are hardly different even in Africa. According to the Economist, “The African Union appears to be unmoved by the catastrophe and is retreating to a policy of ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of its members.” The UN Security Council is also looking away, as is the global media. On April 4th, there was no mention of Sudan on the homepages of the New York Times, the Guardian, the BBC, the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, or any of a dozen mainstream sites checked. It is almost as if a spell was cast to render this one war invisible. In its most basic form, the war is a power struggle between two armed factions that used to be in government together. On one side are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who relocated his government out of Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. On the other are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known universally as Hemedti. While al-Burhan and the SAF hold most of their territory in the east, the RSF’s main base is to the west, in Darfur. Khartoum and the surrounding cities in the center are currently contested — “contested” in the sense that the two factions have nearly destroyed the capital. The Presidential Palace is a bombed-out ruin, the downtown gutted by fire. Government buildings have been destroyed, and basic infrastructure and services have collapsed, forcing most of the population to flee. Neighboring Omdurman, meanwhile, was just regained by the SAF using tactics similar to how Russia conquered Mariupol in 2022: bomb everything flat and then claim victory on the smoking rubble.

War Crimes on Both Sides: Shelling, Looting, and Ethnic Cleansing

Both factions have caused widespread destruction, and both have committed war crimes. The Financial Times reports that the SAF have killed countless civilians by shelling densely-populated urban areas. Foreign Policy, meanwhile, accuses the RSF of being “a looting machine” which has ransacked and burned entire cities before murdering or enslaving the survivors. And then there are the harrowing tales of sexual abuse. To quote the Financial Times: “Women’s campaigners say more than 1,000 women in Khartoum have been raped by fighters from both sides.” Add to this the reports of ethnic cleansing by the RSF against the African Masalit tribe in Darfur, and it is clear that Sudan today is a vision of hell — a place where monstrous men do monstrous things, while few outsiders seem willing to pay attention. Yet it would be wrong to call the crimes committed in Sudan the result of mere anarchy, a free-for-all like the carnage affecting Haiti. Rather, they are the result of tensions and hatreds that stretch back decades.

Seeds of Hate: From Colonial Borders to the Darfur Genocide

Like many large African states with illogical colonial-era borders, Sudan has seen its fair share of civil wars. From the moment it gained independence from the UK in 1956, Sudan almost immediately plunged into a conflict powered by the fissures between north and south — what the New Statesman calls “the country’s division between the majority Arab and Muslim north and the poorer Christian and animist south.” Lasting until the 1970s, the conflict was then followed by a second round that kicked off in 1983 and did not end until 2005. By then, two million people were dead, and Sudan itself had fallen under the iron boot of Islamist dictator Omar al-Bashir, who would reign until 2019. But it is not the two Sudanese civil wars of the 20th and early-21st centuries that have the most impact on today’s conflict. The driving issue of those fights was mostly solved when South Sudan split off in 2011 to form a brand-new country. The conflict with the deepest connection to today’s civil war took place not in Sudan’s south, but its west — specifically, in the vast savannah region known as Darfur. Kicking off in 2003, the Darfur War was the great atrocity of its era. Technically beginning when local armed groups launched a rebellion against the center, it soon devolved into an ethnic conflict marked by a genocidal campaign against Black communities like the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. A campaign carried out, in large part, by the Janjaweed. Arabic-speaking nomads, the Janjaweed militias are the direct ancestors of the Rapid Support Forces currently battling the SAF. Foreign Policy describes how ethnic Arabs first arrived in Darfur 300 years ago, where they quickly prospered: “They were the lords of the desert, rich from trade and camel herding, regarding the darker-skinned farming peoples of the savannahs as their social inferiors, even their slaves.” By the time of the genocide, though, the wealth and power of the Arabic-speakers had been lost. Deprived and lacking in education, they were now the ones looked down on by the elites in Khartoum. Yet few dreamed of overthrowing the center. Instead, the dream was to move out of Darfur’s arid regions and claim its fertile lands to the south. In time, this grew into an Arab supremacist agenda that envisaged the expulsion of Darfur’s darker-skinned residents. When war erupted in 2003, the nomadic tribes finally got their chance. Desperate to end the rebellion in Darfur, Omar al-Bashir authorized the creation of the Janjaweed. These new militias did their jobs well — an estimated 200,000 were killed in the genocide, and two million forced into exile. In 2013, al-Bashir rewarded the Janjaweed by reorganizing them into the Rapid Support Forces and giving their leaders military ranks. In 2017, they would be made independent of the military to act as a counterweight to the SAF, which the dictator feared was getting too powerful. As head of the outfit, Hemedti mostly recruited from his own Rizeigat tribe, although their role quickly expanded beyond operations in Darfur. The New Statesman has likened the RSF to Russia’s Wagner Group — vicious mercenaries who could do any task from fighting a conventional war in Darfur, to guarding the border, to deploying to Yemen as part of the Saudi-led intervention.

Revolution, Betrayal, and the Road to Civil War

The trigger for today’s conflict was the Sudanese Revolution of 2019. In the face of mass protests and widespread civil disobedience against the regime of Omar al-Bashir, the RSF and SAF joined forces with the civilian movement to overthrow the dictator. For one brief moment, it looked like this might be the start of a new era. A joint government was set up between Hemedti and the RSF, General al-Burhan and the SAF, and a civilian element, with the goal of ushering in a transition to democracy. Sadly, a single moment was all it could ever be. Thrust into power, the civilian-led transitional government failed to hold the country together. As Chatham House describes it: “The civilian-led cabinet headed by Abdalla Hamdok could neither stabilize the economy nor loosen the military kleptocrats’ stranglehold over the most profitable sectors. Left to fend for themselves by international donors that failed to appreciate the urgency of a massive bailout, the democrats’ failure was preordained.” In late 2021, al-Burhan and Hemedti again joined forces, this time to depose the civilian leadership. That left a government with two major figures at its head: one paramilitary from a poor background in Darfur, the other a general who seemed to represent the centralized elite. As the Guardian writes: “When attempts to transition to a democratic civilian-led government faltered, many analysts felt an eventual showdown between Burhan and Hemedti was inevitable.” The showdown finally came on April 15, 2023. In the previous months, both the RSF and SAF had deployed huge numbers of forces to the capital, conscious of a looming battle to control Sudan. Initially, the assumption was that the better-armed SAF would win a quick, bloody victory. But as the streets of Khartoum shuddered to the dull thud of bombs, it became clear that things would not be so simple. As of early April 2024, the war looks intractable. While the SAF has had recent successes retaking cities in the capital region around Khartoum, the RSF is dug in in Darfur and regions of the south. According to Sudan expert Cameron Hudson: “Neither side looks capable of delivering a knockout blow.”

The UAE’s Power Play: Arming the RSF and Reshaping the Red Sea

The role multiple major powers are playing behind the scenes in keeping this conflict going is both fascinating and troubling. The fact that Sudan’s conflict has mutated into a proxy war is not exactly a well-kept secret. Scores of respected analysts and institutions have been raising the alarm about it for months. Britain’s Chatham House think tank states: “Sudan has become a cockpit in which the rising powers of the Middle East seek to project their power and gain an advantage over their rivals.” Cameron Hudson is quoted by the Financial Times as saying the war is being fueled by external forces vying for influence in the strategically important country. Long an important US ally in the Gulf, the UAE has emerged in recent years as an active player in both the Middle East and Africa — often pursuing policies at odds with America’s stated interests. It is Abu Dhabi, for example, that bankrolled Ethiopia’s leader Abiy Ahmed, including by supplying him with the drones that helped him win the bloody Tigray War. The most relevant part is the hand Abu Dhabi had in the 2019 overthrow of Omar al-Bashir. In the chaos that surrounded Sudan’s revolution, the UAE was among the first states to establish ties with the civilian-led Transitional Council. Per World Politics Review: “Abu Dhabi shepherded the post-Bashir transition on terms favorable to its preferences and interests.” One major goal was to win backing to invest in the $6 billion Abu Amama port complex on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Abu Dhabi’s role also had a political dimension. Since the Arab Spring saw a rising tide of Islamist parties, it has been UAE policy to keep political Islam firmly in its box. In Sudan, this became a major priority, not just because the SAF had ties to al-Bashir’s old Islamist government, but because of the post-revolution rise of religious militias such as the Al-Bara bin Malik Brigade. Abu Dhabi cozied up to the RSF and Hemedti as a possible bulwark. When war broke out, that turned into strong military support. Over the past year, multiple allegations have surfaced that the UAE is flying weapons and supplies into Chad and then smuggling them over the border to the RSF in Darfur. A leaked document prepared by experts for the UN Security Council found “credible” evidence that UAE flights intended for humanitarian aid were instead distributing arms to Hemedti’s forces. While Abu Dhabi flatly rejects this, multiple analysts believe the UAE is critical to keeping the RSF in the game. Sudan expert Hamid Khalafallah declared: “If the UAE withdraws its support and cuts ties with the RSF today, there’s an 80 per cent chance the war might end tomorrow.” In December, a UAE jet flew Hemedti to Ethiopia for a meeting with Abiy Ahmed — a sign, perhaps, that President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) envisages a future alliance of states in the region that rely on his support.

Enemy of My Enemy: Iran’s Drones and the Battle for Port Sudan

As recently as the start of 2024, the SAF appeared to be in crisis. After a string of losses, there were open calls for General al-Burhan to step down. But then came the assault on Omdurman, in which the SAF cut through the nation’s biggest city, breaking an RSF siege and setting their units up for a future push towards Khartoum. At the time of writing in early April, the SAF appeared to be on the front foot for the first time since war broke out. Starting in January, Iranian cargo planes began making mass deliveries to SAF-controlled Port Sudan. Reports claimed they were carrying new Mohajer 6 drones — reports verified a few weeks later when the drones helped bomb a route through Omdurman to break the siege. That the drones were delivered at all is somewhat surprising. Sudan cut all diplomatic ties with Iran in 2016 as a show of solidarity with Saudi Arabia. Yet the SAF’s need for Iranian weapons came at a moment when Tehran was looking to expand its influence in Africa. President Ebrahim Raisi visited multiple African nations in 2023, looking to build ties against the West. More importantly, Tehran has recently been looking to get a toehold on the Red Sea. World Politics Review reports that the UAE has spent the last few years looking to “freeze Iran out of the Red Sea and Horn of Africa regions,” something Abu Dhabi had been having success with. In Somaliland, UAE state-owned DP World developed and managed the Red Sea coast port. In Yemen, Abu Dhabi managed to seize the Mayun and Socotra islands. This gave the UAE “control of strategic maritime choke points in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.” Backing the RSF may have also been part of the UAE’s attempt to keep Iran at bay. If that is the case, it may have backfired. The Wall Street Journal reports that Iran is — unsuccessfully so far — pressing al-Burhan for permission to build a permanent naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. The involvement of other nations defies expected alliances. The US, for example, is both a UAE ally and a foe of Iran, yet absolutely does not back the RSF. Instead, Washington’s position is to get both sides to agree to a ceasefire and peace talks. Russia’s role is odder still. Moscow and Tehran are trying to forge an anti-Western axis, with Iran supplying Russia drones and weapons to use in its war against Ukraine. On the ground in Sudan, though, the two are backing different horses. While Iran rushes to arm the SAF, the Wagner Group is backing Hemedti and the RSF.

Wagner, Gold, and Ukraine’s Special Forces in Sudan

The reason Wagner is helping Hemedti is likely due to the warlord’s control of Sudan’s gold mines. According to the Economist, the RSF is the main player in Sudan’s gold industry, smuggling tons of bullion out to the UAE where it is sold on the gold market. This has helped make Hemedti rich and kept the RSF afloat financially. But it has also been useful to Russia, with smuggled Sudanese gold today one of the main ways Moscow circumnavigates Western sanctions. In return for access to gold mines, Wagner has supplied the RSF with surface-to-air missiles, allowing them to shoot down SAF fighter jets. Wagner’s involvement has also led to the arrival of Ukrainian special forces in Sudan, where they have partnered with the SAF to hunt down and kill Wagner mercenaries. This highlights how sprawling the proxy war in Sudan has become — countries thousands of kilometers away are now vying for advantage on its dusty battlefields, often fighting in strange, unnatural configurations. And these are just some of the major countries involved. Egypt has played a role in undermining the civilian-led Transitional Council. Turkey has been arming the SAF. The RSF is heavily recruiting among nomadic Arabs in nations like Niger. Sudan also borders Libya in its far-northwest, which is useful to the Wagner Group, allied with the warlord who controls Libya’s eastern regions: Khalifa Haftar. According to a recent Guardian investigation, the mercenaries are conducting large-scale fuel smuggling across the border, which is then used by the RSF to keep their vehicles running. One Libyan official described it to the Guardian: “The Wagner Group is shepherding this fuel across the border into Sudan. If we close the border between Libya and Sudan for fuel, the war in Sudan will end. It is not a high technology war like in Ukraine. It is an old war involving 4x4 cars, and without fuel it will stop.”

A Match on a Gigantic Pyre: The Risk of Regional Conflagration

For a brief moment at the start of 2024, it looked like Sudan’s war might be limping towards some conclusion. With the RSF on a roll, deposed leader of the civilian administration Abdalla Hamdok signed a joint declaration with Hemedti’s forces for a roadmap back to peace. Hamdok’s group also reached out to the SAF, in the hopes of finding an agreement all sides could live with. Sadly for Hamdok, the recent battlefield gains by the SAF have rendered his proposal moot. Worse, his civilian-led group has disgraced itself in the eyes of many Sudanese for appearing to side with the genocidal RSF. That makes it harder than ever to imagine a future in which Sudan finds lasting peace. The instability is already spreading far beyond Sudan’s borders. Chatham House notes how the war is pulling in countries as diverse as Chad and Central African Republic — now overwhelmed by Sudanese refugees. Then there are the effects the conflict is having on South Sudan. Formerly part of Sudan, South Sudan split off to become independent in 2011, taking the most lucrative oil fields with it. But because it is landlocked, the new nation continued to pump its oil across its old overlord. This became a massive problem in February 2024, when a major pipeline ruptured in Sudan and fighting was too intense to send in engineers to fix it. The result: a gigantic loss of income for South Sudan — an extremely poor, extremely unstable state that gets 90 percent of its revenue from oil sales. The economic hit could potentially either tilt South Sudan into chaos, or else induce the government to militarily intervene in Sudan’s conflict to restore the pipeline. To quote Chatham House one final time: “The wider Red Sea is an arena of geo-strategic contest where the embers are already smoldering for a wider war that drags in all the world’s main powers.” The Center for Strategic and International Studies talks of a “Libya scenario,” where the SAF is able to retake the capital and central cities but unable to shake the RSF from its stronghold in Darfur to the west. The result would be a Sudan largely split between east and west, just as happened in Libya. Libya’s collapse was an epoch-shaking disaster. Aside from the violence, the partition of Libya sent waves of refugees scrambling for Europe, forever altering the continent’s politics. The void at the center allowed space for terrorist groups to flourish, while the emergence of warlords led to the Wagner Group’s arrival. In America, the Benghazi attack led to the sprawling House Benghazi Committee investigation, which became central to politics for years. And this was just from the collapse of Libya, a country of around seven million people — about the size of Massachusetts. Now scale that up to Sudan, a nation both physically larger, and with a population closer to that of California and Massachusetts combined. The CSIS bluntly put it: “Sudan’s collapse would be cataclysmic, well beyond the extent of Libya’s collapse.”

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is causing the war in Sudan?

The war in Sudan is being fought between two main factions: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. Their power struggle, which began on April 15, 2023, has led to the destruction of cities, the killing of at least 13,000 people, and the displacement of over 8 million people. The conflict has also drawn in other countries, including Iran, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, which are backing different factions in the hopes of gaining an advantage. As of early April 2023, the SAF held most of its territory in the east, while the RSF’s main base was in Darfur to the west.

Why is Sudan banned from the US?

Sudan was previously subject to US sanctions and was listed as a state sponsor of terrorism from 1993 to 2020, but the current conflict in Sudan is not directly related to its ban from the US. The US had imposed sanctions on Sudan due to its alleged support for terrorism and human rights abuses, particularly during the rule of Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted in 2019. Although Sudan is no longer listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, the US still has sanctions in place due to ongoing human rights concerns and the current conflict.

Is Sudan a Chinese ally?

While Sudan has received significant investment from China in recent years, particularly in the oil sector, it is not considered a direct Chinese ally in the current conflict. China has maintained a neutral stance on the conflict, calling for a peaceful resolution and an end to the violence. However, China has significant economic interests in Sudan, and its companies have invested heavily in the country’s oil and infrastructure sectors. As of 2023, China is one of the largest investors in Sudan, but its role in the conflict is largely focused on protecting its economic interests rather than taking a direct military or political stance.

What caused the war in Sudan in 2023?

The war in Sudan began on April 15, 2023, as a result of a power struggle within the government that had taken power following the 2021 coup. The conflict is primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. The power struggle between these two factions, which had previously been part of the same government, led to the outbreak of violence and the subsequent destruction of cities and displacement of millions of people. As of February 5, 2025, the conflict is ongoing, with both sides suffering significant losses and the humanitarian situation continuing to deteriorate.

What caused the Civil War in Sudan?

The current civil war in Sudan is a result of a complex set of factors, including a power struggle within the government, ethnic and regional tensions, and the legacy of previous conflicts. The second Sudanese civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2005, killed an estimated two million people and had a profound impact on the country. The current conflict is also influenced by the 2021 coup, which led to the formation of a new government and the subsequent power struggle between the SAF and RSF. Additionally, the conflict has been exacerbated by the involvement of external actors, including Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates, which are backing different factions in the hopes of gaining an advantage.

Who won the Sudanese Civil War?

The second Sudanese civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2005, did not have a clear winner, as it ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA led to the establishment of a power-sharing government and the holding of elections in 2010. However, the current conflict in Sudan, which began in 2023, is ongoing, and it is too early to determine a winner. The conflict has resulted in significant losses for both the SAF and RSF, and the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. As of February 5, 2025, the conflict is still ongoing, with no clear end in sight.

When did the war erupt in Sudan?

The current war in Sudan erupted on April 15, 2023, as a result of a power struggle within the government that had taken power following the 2021 coup. The conflict began with clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. Since then, the conflict has escalated, resulting in the destruction of cities, the killing of at least 13,000 people, and the displacement of over 8 million people. As of early April 2023, the conflict was still ongoing, with both sides suffering significant losses and the humanitarian situation continuing to deteriorate.

What caused the refugee crisis in Sudan?

The refugee crisis in Sudan is a result of the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which began on April 15, 2023. The conflict has led to the destruction of cities, the killing of at least 13,000 people, and the displacement of over 8 million people. The UN estimates that 25 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, while the International Rescue Committee estimates that seven million could be on the brink of famine. The conflict has also led to a significant refugee crisis, with people fleeing to neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Egypt, in search of safety and assistance. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, has been accused of human rights abuses, particularly in the Darfur region, which has contributed to the refugee crisis.

Related Coverage

• South Sudan is on Fire. Here’s Why. (And More)
• Is the 21st Century’s Deadliest War about to Restart? And More.
• Sudan’s Forgotten War: Why the World Looks Away
• Sudan’s Forgotten War: How Two Generals Plunged Africa Into Catastrophe
• Sudan’s Partition: Ethnic Cleansing and the Push for a Divided State

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