Myanmar's Civil War Has Entered the Endgame: Resistance Forces Close In on Military Junta

Myanmar's military junta faces collapse as resistance forces advance. Explore the Three Brotherhood Alliance, strategic scenarios, and Myanmar's uncertain

Simon Whistler February 17, 2026

Deep in the jungles of Myanmar, a brutal civil war is reaching its critical phase. On one side stands a military dictatorship led by General Min Aung Hlaing, a cabal of generals who seized control through a 2021 coup and have since carried out countless atrocities against their own people. On the other side fights a rebel alliance comprising resistance armies, insurgent militias, and ordinary citizens defending their families and communities. The Three Brotherhood Alliance, serving as the tip of the resistance spear, has transformed what was once a patchwork of fruitless local insurgencies into a formidable force capable of toppling the regime. As of late August 2024, the rebels are advancing toward their endgame, with the military junta defeated across the countryside and retreating from major bases that seemed impossible to capture just a year ago. General Min Aung Hlaing and his dictatorship are running out of places to hide, setting the stage for a final showdown in the coming months.

Key Takeaways

Myanmar’s civil war has reached a critical phase with resistance forces controlling approximately 86% of territory as of mid-2024, while the military junta controls only 14% including the three major cities.

The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) launched Operation 1027 in October 2023, transforming scattered insurgencies into a coordinated offensive that has systematically dismantled junta control across the countryside.

The junta’s troops suffer from low morale, inadequate training, and a pattern of retreat or surrender rather than fighting, with many forced into military service against their will.

The resistance faces its greatest challenge ahead: taking fortified urban centers where the junta has consolidated forces, heavy equipment, and defensive advantages that favor conventional warfare over the guerrilla tactics that brought rebel success.

Three potential paths to victory include Chinese intervention (least likely), internal Tatmadaw collapse through siege and attrition, or popular urban uprisings coordinated with embedded resistance cells (most promising).

The National Unity Government represents a unified political vision for post-war Myanmar with strong diaspora support, but there’s no guarantee the diverse resistance factions will unite behind it after defeating the junta.

The Complexity of Myanmar’s Conflict

Myanmar’s civil war defies simple characterization as a battle between good and evil. While the rebels fight against a brutal military dictatorship, this remains a deeply complex civil war in a deeply complex nation. Every organization involved carries its own history, motivations, and skeletons in the closet—including both the ruling junta and the resistance groups, despite the nobility many observers attribute to the rebel cause.

The conflict involves literally hundreds of militias, most organized along ethnic or geographic lines. Understanding the current state requires familiarity with three core categories of combatants, each playing distinct roles in the ongoing struggle for control of Myanmar. This complexity reflects generations of insurgencies and ethnic tensions that preceded the current phase of fighting, creating a landscape where alliances shift and motivations intertwine in ways that resist oversimplification.

The Military Junta and the Tatmadaw

The military junta ruling Myanmar operates under General Min Aung Hlaing’s command. They seized power in 2021 through a coup d’état that overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi, the nation’s indirectly elected State Chancellor and Nobel laureate. Based in the capital city of Naypyidaw in Myanmar’s heart, the junta rules through force, relying on the national military known as the Tatmadaw to assert control in cities and countryside alike. They also draw support from various ethnic militias that rally to their cause.

The Tatmadaw maintains what it considers an ideal staggered structure: major military bases and complete control over the biggest cities, regional commands in each area of the country, a network of smaller military bases dotting the countryside in and around towns, and countless outposts and checkpoints throughout rural areas. Between the junta’s ever-present troops across the nation and their long-running use of indiscriminate air raids and shelling against civilian populations perceived as dissident, they maintained control over Myanmar—until recently. This control structure, designed to project power throughout the country, has become increasingly difficult to maintain as resistance forces have systematically dismantled it from the periphery inward.

The Three Brotherhood Alliance

The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) represents the coordinated core of the resistance movement. The “three” refers to the trio of founding members: the Araken Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. These three groups united in 2019 while waging separate battles against the Tatmadaw well before the coup.

Although the three groups were getting somewhat the worse end of their engagements with the Tatmadaw at that time, they stabilized their regions after banding together by coordinating their attacks. Following the coup, they didn’t immediately declare war on the junta. Instead, they consolidated their territory and trained thousands of troops while making inroads with other resistance groups, especially in urban areas. During this period, they watched as the junta spread itself thin fighting various ethnic militias from other parts of Myanmar.

On October 27, 2023, the 3BHA seized their moment and launched Operation 1027, a massive assault on the junta that continues at the time of this writing. This operation marked a turning point in the conflict, transforming scattered resistance efforts into a coordinated offensive that has systematically rolled back junta control across vast swaths of the country.

Other Resistance Forces and the National Unity Government

Beyond the 3BHA, numerous other militias and armies fight for their own aims while fundamentally opposing the junta. Some have been fighting for decades, while others recently started. Some comprise only a few dozen fighters, while others field armies in the tens of thousands. Like the rest of their nation, they are long-accustomed to asymmetric warfare, operating in jungles and hills where the junta’s heavy equipment cannot reach.

Among the most prominent are the Karen National Liberation Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Chin Brotherhood Alliance, and the Pa-O National Liberation Army. Representing most of these groups, along with the 3BHA, is the National Unity Government, a government-in-exile that lives and works in hiding inside Myanmar. This body handles both internal affairs between the militias and foreign relations with governments of other nations eager to support an alternative to the ruling junta.

Although none of these other groups were formally part of Operation 1027, many have seized the moment or taken their cues to open new offensives of their own, rallying alongside the 3BHA to put pressure on the junta from all angles. This coordination, while imperfect, represents an unprecedented level of unity among Myanmar’s historically fractious resistance movements.

The Pattern of Junta Collapse

Since the start of Operation 1027, the relative unity between major resistance members has led to a cascade of defeats for the junta. The civil war has settled into a consistent rhythm that reveals fundamental weaknesses in the Tatmadaw’s structure and morale. Understanding this pattern requires recognizing key characteristics of junta troops: most lack adequate training, many lack fighting discipline or experience, and by and large, they prefer to live to tomorrow instead of dying for their country today.

This reality means junta troops are generally open to retreat or even surrender. When they understand that whatever target they’re supposed to defend will probably fall one way or another, they’re usually happy to leave town rather than see the fight play itself out. The grand rhythm proceeds as follows: Junta troops scattered among innumerable small, hard-to-defend outposts hear rumors that the rebel army in their area has been blazing through outposts without much trouble. When they hear the rebels are coming, they pick up their belongings, pile into Toyotas and jeeps, and leave before the rebels arrive.

Once this process repeats enough times that most outposts are vacated, the rebels demonstrate they can consistently take the next-biggest target—the small bases outside so many of Myanmar’s towns. The next time rebels come calling, troops on whichever base is in their crosshairs probably pick up, get into their vehicles, and leave. The same process repeats at the next-highest level with local major bases, then at regional command centers, and eventually at the hardest targets: the cities and core military bases.

Currently, the rebels are climbing this ladder, consistently able to take over the biggest local bases and demonstrating they can bring down regional command centers. The junta has taken major losses, including significant fatalities, but often the Tatmadaw withdraws rather than fights, even when leaving behind weapons, heavy fighting equipment, supplies, and resistance prisoners. In many instances, they surrender en masse in the hundreds, including even generals unlucky enough to be posted to regional defense positions. Morale among junta troops in the countryside is at an all-time low, while resistance expertise in rooting them out and forcing retreat is at an all-time high.

The Current Map of Control

The rebels have captured border checkpoints, established arrangements with neighbor nations, and set up local government infrastructure in territory they control. Meanwhile, the junta, despite their better equipment, simply lacks the means or will to carry out a counteroffensive. They’re being pushed back continually, squeezed into a smaller and smaller corner until, from the rebels’ perspective, the pressure becomes too much to bear.

As of now, the map of control in Myanmar is what the New York Times described in April 2024 as “a kaleidoscopic array of competing influences, fiefs, democratic havens and drug-lord hideouts.” The junta controls a decent portion of the country, including a critical stretch of land joining the three largest cities: Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw. According to a July article by The Economist, this accounts for just fourteen percent of Myanmar’s territory and just one-third of its population in areas under stable junta control. The rest is overtaken.

The Karen National Liberation Army and the Karenni control much of the border with China. The Araken Army, a 3BHA member, controls the entire border with Bangladesh. The Chin and the People’s Defense Force control much of the border with India, while the Kachin, the Ta’ang, the MNDAA, and the autonomous region of Wa State all split the border with Myanmar’s critical neighbor, China. The junta controls some territory in the north, some near the border with Laos, and some on Myanmar’s long southward stretch of coastline—but each of those patches of territory are soon to be cut off, encircled, and either kept isolated or taken outright. Some may have already fallen to the rebels by the time of reading.

If the junta is going to hold out anywhere, it’s in those three key cities, supported by the network of military installations dotting the landscape in that area. This is the junta’s power base, and currently it’s a hard-shelled nut that the resistance is trying to crack.

The Challenge of Urban Warfare

Myanmar’s rebels have already achieved impressive results. They’ve taken incredible amounts of territory, largely proved able to run a somewhat coordinated insurgency without internal conflict, and are gaining power every single day. However, with respect to their stunning showing and the staggering number of lives already lost, the truth remains: what the rebel alliance just accomplished is the easy part.

Taking the cities, along with the junta’s major military bases, introduces a whole new level of challenge. Part of the problem is simple mathematics. So many junta troops have been retreating from so many outposts and bases, coming from so many directions, all streaming back into consolidated, defensible points where holding out will be much easier. The regime has a proper nation’s worth of military equipment there, and for the rebels to attack these strongholds would introduce a new element that’s been largely absent.

If the rebels surround the junta’s base of power, they’ll have succeeded in putting the Tatmadaw between a rock and a hard place—but as the Tatmadaw becomes less slippery, it may become considerably more resolute. The same troops unwilling to defend remote provincial outposts might find themselves far more willing to fight when they know there’s nowhere left to run and understand that certain death awaits them in defeat.

The Junta’s Consolidated Advantages

Beyond the ability of junta troops to consolidate and potentially rally are other difficult realities that come with a more concentrated defending force. The Tatmadaw’s tanks and armored fighting vehicles, its strafing ground-attack aircraft, and its rare but talented elite shock troops don’t make much difference when sent into the countryside in small numbers. However, they work far better if a hundred tanks, a dozen fighter jets, and a battalion of actually-decent troops happen to be in the same place at the same time.

The idea that they could place a unified rebel army at a numeric disadvantage at this stage seems unlikely. But the junta still has the means to place them at a material and firepower disadvantage if they choose when and where to fight. The downside of having pushed the junta out of much of Myanmar is that they’re now far harder to ambush. They can draw on more tightly controlled supply lines, substantial reserves of critical resources, and, although the junta has never been popular in Myanmar, there are loyalists to draw on as well.

It’s unclear just how long the junta could survive a siege, stuck on perhaps the ten percent of territory it controls most firmly. But with sea access and the bulk of its firepower, that answer is more likely to be on the scale of years than weeks. This reality presents the resistance with a fundamental strategic dilemma that will determine the conflict’s ultimate outcome.

The Strategic Quandary

Myanmar’s resistance groups are now puzzling through a critical question: If the rest of the territory currently under Tatmadaw control falls sooner than later, and the junta is backed up into the territory it most securely controls, then what comes next? Someone, somewhere within the resistance probably has answers to this question, but whatever those answers are, they haven’t been shared with the global public.

What those plans certainly are not is to launch a full frontal assault and see tens of thousands on both sides mowed down in a battle that the junta would stand a chance of winning. Instead, three hypothetical options emerge based on expert opinions on what the next phase of this war might look like, combined with educated analysis. These scenarios range from the least likely to the most probable, each carrying distinct implications for how Myanmar’s civil war might ultimately resolve.

Plan C: Chinese Intervention

The long shot is the prospect of direct intervention in Myanmar’s ongoing conflict by China, its more powerful neighbor to the north. China has long used a heavy hand in Myanmar, backing governments or pushing them down as Beijing sees fit, but their approach has been as nuanced as it’s been forceful. For a long time, China has balanced itself in the ongoing conflict, sending weapons to militias including groups that it knows will trade with the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other resistance organizations, while simultaneously supplying the junta with the military equipment it needs to survive.

Now, China’s hedging has turned into what writer Lucas Myers described for War on the Rocks as “mismanaging of the unmanageable.” Rather than stay stagnant in a strategy that’s no longer working, Beijing has adjusted in a way that the junta has not been happy to see. With Min Aung Hlaing’s troops being defeated throughout Myanmar’s jungles, China has worked to establish relations with the resistance groups that now occupy the other side of their border.

Beijing has been thankful to the Three Brotherhood Alliance for helping to tamp down on a cyber-scamming industry in Myanmar that defrauds Chinese citizens of billions of US dollars’ worth of their wealth every year. China has still played both sides of the conflict, but its decisions have broadly favored the Three Brotherhood Alliance, recognizing that even if Beijing would prefer the junta in charge, that’s a prospect that probably can’t be recovered at this stage.

The Junta’s Relationship with Beijing

The junta may or may not believe it could retake Myanmar with China’s help, but one thing it knows for certain is that it’s royally screwed if China comes down on the other side. As a result, the junta’s current posture toward Beijing has less to do with making any specific requests for major assistance and more with appeasing Xi Jinping and hoping for the best.

For the short term, that approach seems to be working. At the time of writing, China has recently promised that it would help the junta run a census and then an election, while politely brushing off Min Aung Hlaing’s accusations that Beijing is sending weapons to the resistance. That promise for electoral support is most likely an attempt to offer the junta a way out of its mess, in hopes that the conflict can still be drawn down.

But if the junta plays its current hand poorly—perhaps by insisting that a peaceful reconciliation is impossible—China might conclude that supporting the junta is no longer in its interest. What comes next could happen in two ways. Option one, the more likely, is that China’s material support for the resistance would increase. This could include shipment of more or better weapons, provision of a wider array of supplies, or delivery of armor, artillery, and other heavy equipment that the resistance has thus far been lacking.

Option two is less likely but bears consideration: Chinese boots on the ground. That could come in several forms—perhaps by temporarily removing the uniforms and badges of some elite troops or fighter pilots and sending them in as unidentified mercenaries like Russia did in Crimea in 2014. Or it could involve limited postings of Chinese troops to deter the junta from engaging in attacks or counterattacks. In an extreme scenario, China could send its army in with intent to kill.

Any of these options are not likely. After all, Beijing is very cautious when it comes to military matters and has a long history of declining to intervene in moments like this. But with Beijing looking to signal and test its preparedness for war, there’s a small but real possibility that Myanmar could be a place for troops to pick up experience in live combat. Nonetheless, Chinese intervention remains what can be classified as the least likely of three scenarios—Plan C.

Plan B: Internal Tatmadaw Collapse

If Chinese intervention is Plan C, then Plan B centers not around China but the Tatmadaw itself. The Tatmadaw is going through a very hard time at this stage in the conflict, and to say that morale is in the toilet is quite frankly an insult to toilets. Even Tatmadaw soldiers who’ve retreated to the strongholds have keen recollection of their superiors’ struggle and often disinterest in getting them food or basic medical care, of the junta’s willingness to direct them to stay and die defending outposts that everyone knew were a lost cause. Many remember being forced to serve in the military in the first place, despite never having had even the slightest intention of signing up.

The analysis has posited that those same troops, backed into a corner with more allies beside them but nowhere to run, might find it within themselves to stand and fight. But what if the battle they’re waiting for simply never arrives? This scenario envisions a collapse from within—a possibility rooted in the fundamental weakness of an army whose soldiers have little reason to fight and every reason to question why they’re defending a regime that has shown such callous disregard for their lives and welfare.

Plan A: The Siege Strategy and Slow Attrition

The most strategic approach available to Myanmar’s resistance forces involves avoiding the bloodbath of direct urban assault entirely. Instead, this plan envisions the rebel armies enclosing the junta into its cities and bases—and then simply waiting. The concept centers on cooking Min Aung Hlaing and his generals, along with their troops, in a long and arduous slow-roasting that sees supplies dwindle, food reserves run out, and vectors of escape slowly eliminated.

This siege approach capitalizes on time as a weapon, transforming the junta’s consolidated position from a strength into a vulnerability. While the Tatmadaw has retreated to defensible strongholds with substantial military equipment, these positions require constant resupply to remain viable. By maintaining a perimeter and cutting off supply lines, the resistance could force the junta to consume its own reserves while morale continues its downward spiral. The soldiers who retreated to these strongholds already carry memories of their superiors’ struggle and often disinterest in providing basic necessities like food or medical care, of being directed to stay and die defending outposts everyone knew were lost causes.

The Tatmadaw has a well-established history of overthrowing leaders of Myanmar who don’t follow its will. If one squints and tilts their head slightly, Min Aung Hlaing himself is a leader of Myanmar, regardless of what the patches on his chest might indicate of his station. If military morale can be pushed low enough through prolonged siege conditions, the rebels stand a chance at making one of two scenarios unfold while they hold their perimeter.

The first possibility involves some of the generals within Min Aung Hlaing’s own leadership getting restless, eventually toppling him and replacing him with a figure willing to negotiate a return to nationwide civilian government. The second scenario sees the generals stripped of choice entirely, amid a mutiny by junior officers and enlisted troops who have endured hunger and deprivation for too long. Many of these soldiers were forced to serve in the military in the first place, despite never having had even the slightest intention of signing up. Their loyalty to the regime remains paper-thin at best.

Either pathway to internal collapse will take considerable time to materialize, but the possibility remains very real. The process of getting there requires patience and discipline from resistance forces—qualities they have demonstrated throughout their systematic campaign across Myanmar’s countryside. By planting the seeds of rebellion within the junta’s own ranks through deprivation and isolation, the resistance may achieve what direct assault cannot.

The Urban Uprising: Resistance from Within the Cities

By planting the seeds of internal rebellion within Tatmadaw ranks, the resistance also finds its way to what may be their best chance at breaking the junta’s strongholds wide open: the prospect of a popular revolt, not by the ethnic militias in the countryside, but by the people of the cities themselves. This represents perhaps the most promising scenario for the resistance—a strategy that transforms the junta’s supposed strongholds into battlegrounds where the regime’s own citizens rise against it.

The junta loyalists who do exist in Myanmar primarily call its biggest cities home, but even there, the junta tends to rule more by fear than by love. The regime’s grip on urban populations has never been secure, and recent actions have further eroded whatever support remained. In one stark example of the junta’s willingness to shake even the confidence of its city-dwelling citizens, this past February saw a return of mass conscription laws in junta-controlled areas. The junta followed through on the conscription drive they promised, sending thousands of unwilling young men and women out to the front lines at a time when support was already dwindling.

The conscription campaign backfired spectacularly in many respects. Thousands of other young people fled to join resistance groups rather than serve the junta, while others left the country outright. The policy demonstrated to urban populations that proximity to power centers offers no protection from the regime’s demands and brutality. In much of Myanmar, including the major cities, ordinary people would quite like to see a return to civilian leadership and democratic rule. Many are horrified, as one might expect, by the incredible brutality the junta has shown against its own civilians elsewhere in the country.

Although the people of Yangon and Mandalay may not share an ethnicity or a home with the people the junta has massacred in rural areas and ethnic regions, one thing is abundantly clear: simply being a citizen of Myanmar is not enough to stop Min Aung Hlaing from turning on you when he sees fit. This realization has profound implications for urban populations who once believed their location in major cities might insulate them from the worst of the regime’s violence.

Pressure on the Urban Strongholds

The resistance has already begun to put direct pressure on the junta in those cities, demonstrating that even the regime’s core territories are not safe from attack. These operations include drone and rocket attacks on Naypyidaw, bomb attacks in Yangon, and visible massing of forces near the most vulnerable of the three cities, Mandalay. The message being sent is unmistakable: Even in your strongholds, we can get to you, and we’re coming.

Each of the three cities possesses some limited strategic vulnerability that the resistance can potentially exploit. Mandalay sits on the fringes of junta territory and is backed onto a river that can be used to encircle it, creating natural chokepoints for supply lines. Naypyidaw, despite being the capital, isn’t far from major resistance group territory, making it vulnerable to sustained pressure. Yangon is backed up to the sea, making it vulnerable from that direction if Myanmar’s southern tail is taken over by resistance forces—a scenario that becomes more likely as the junta’s territorial control continues to shrink.

But far more important than these geographic vulnerabilities is the work that the resistance has already done, and will continue to do, inside the cities themselves. Elements of the major rebel groups are already operating within urban areas, especially the People’s Defense Force, the multi-ethnic group that serves as an armed wing of the National Unity Government. These embedded resistance elements are widely understood to be recruiting, establishing rebel cells, and laying the groundwork for the stage that comes next.

The hope appears to be that they can either dismantle the major cities from inside through coordinated sabotage and attacks on regime infrastructure, or, more likely, inspire the public to join a mass popular revolt. If they can achieve that goal, toppling one of the cities, perhaps two, or even all three, then the junta will lose many of its troops and be forced into a defense solely from its largest military bases—a losing effort that the junta probably wouldn’t be inclined, or equipped, to continue for long. The fall of even one major city to popular uprising would represent a psychological blow from which the regime might never recover, potentially triggering cascading defections and surrenders elsewhere.

The Risk of Stalemate

Despite the promising scenarios outlined in Plans A, B, and C, there exists a very real chance that such a breakthrough will be slow to come, or perhaps won’t come at all. The resistance’s momentum, while impressive, is not guaranteed to carry them through the final and most difficult phase of the conflict. If the junta can play its cards right, focusing on withdrawing and holding its stronghold territory at all costs, then it’s unlikely that a full-scale attack by the rebels would be enough—assuming the rebels aren’t able to arm themselves to the level that they could truly go toe-to-toe with concentrated Tatmadaw forces.

This reality must be emphasized: these are organizations built and trained for asymmetric warfare. While they’re not incapable of learning to use the tanks and artillery they capture from retreating junta forces, they cannot overcome their current equipment deficit through heart and fighting spirit alone. The transition from guerrilla warfare in jungles and hills to conventional warfare in urban environments requires not just different equipment but different training, different tactics, and different organizational structures.

The resistance has proven extraordinarily effective at the type of warfare they’ve been waging—ambushes, raids on isolated outposts, coordinated attacks on supply convoys, and the systematic dismantling of the junta’s dispersed control structure. But storming fortified urban positions defended by concentrated armor, artillery, and air power represents a fundamentally different challenge. Without substantial increases in heavy weaponry, anti-aircraft capabilities, and armored vehicles, the resistance may find itself unable to deliver the knockout blow even as it controls the vast majority of Myanmar’s territory.

This potential stalemate scenario could see the conflict drawn down into a lower-intensity struggle while some semblance of order returns to most places, but with the fundamental question of Myanmar’s governance left unresolved. The junta would remain in control of its urban core, the resistance would control the countryside and borders, and neither side would possess the capability to decisively defeat the other. Such an outcome would represent neither victory nor defeat for either side, but rather a frozen conflict that could persist for years.

The National Unity Government’s Vision

As attention turns to Myanmar’s potential future, the organization that bears primary responsibility for the vision of post-war governance is the National Unity Government—a well-liked organization within Myanmar that has proven able to command the enthusiasm of a wide range of ethnic militias and peacetime leaders. The NUG represents the closest thing to a unified political vision for Myanmar’s future, offering a framework for democratic governance that could, in theory, replace the military dictatorship.

The National Unity Government captures strong support across ethnicities, with one study in early 2024 indicating that nearly nine in ten members of Myanmar’s diaspora population around the world have a somewhat or highly favorable opinion of them. Those numbers only count for so much, considering that most people polled weren’t living in Myanmar at the time, but they do mean something—they suggest that the NUG’s vision resonates with Myanmar’s people, even those who have fled the conflict.

The National Unity Government does have a concrete plan for governance. They’ve established a complete shadow government structure: a president, a vice president, a state counsellor, a prime minister, a full set of ministers, and more, all operating in exile within Myanmar and waiting for the opportunity to take the lead. They are highly influential among resistance groups, and if the various factions of Myanmar’s resistance choose to support them, then the plan for governance and international recognition that they offer actually seems as if it could work.

The NUG has spent years building relationships with ethnic armed organizations, establishing administrative structures in liberated territories, and presenting itself to the international community as the legitimate government of Myanmar. They have articulated a vision for federal democracy that would grant substantial autonomy to ethnic regions while maintaining national unity—a delicate balance that addresses one of Myanmar’s longest-standing sources of conflict.

The Fragmentation Risk

But there’s no guarantee that those same resistance organizations would support the National Unity Government if push came to shove. In the Myanmar that would likely result from a defeat of the junta, no single faction is likely to be powerful enough to assert control over the others. This fundamental reality poses perhaps the greatest threat to Myanmar’s post-conflict stability.

The National Unity Government’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Force, is powerful, but not powerful enough to pacify the major resistance groups, let alone if the Three Brotherhood Alliance remains allied and chooses not to play nice. The Tatmadaw would be shattered by that point, perhaps rebuilding, but not fast enough to assert any real level of control. Nor would any of the resistance groups, even the 3BHA, be able to take power for themselves and impose their will on the others.

The idea that all these disparate groups would voluntarily unite behind the National Unity Government is far from a guarantee. Every single one of these organizations acts in its own interest, with its own set of incentives, often prioritizing its own ethnic or regional community above any other consideration. Some are autocratic in the territory they control, some are negligent in providing services to populations under their authority, some are exploitative of local resources and populations, and some have adopted troubling practices that mirror the junta’s own behavior.

The Araken Army of the 3BHA, in particular, has been accused of extreme and indiscriminate violence against the country’s predominantly Muslim Rohingya minority—the same group that has faced treatment by Myanmar’s government that most of the world agrees constituted genocide. This raises deeply uncomfortable questions about whether a resistance victory would necessarily translate into justice and protection for all of Myanmar’s people, or whether it might simply replace one form of oppression with another for vulnerable minorities.

Other groups thrive, or even depend outright, on the drug trade, to the point that last December, the UN declared that Myanmar had become the world’s leading producer of opium. Methamphetamines aren’t exactly a niche industry either, and nor are other sorts of organized crime, including the cyber-scams that China so recently thanked the 3BHA for working to constrain. These economic realities create powerful incentives for armed groups to maintain autonomous control over their territories rather than submit to centralized governance that might threaten their revenue streams.

Two Paths Forward

Despite the promise and potential of Myanmar’s grand uprising, two equally likely paths forward exist now. The first sees the resistance unify under the National Unity Government as much of the world hopes they will, establishing a federal democratic system that grants ethnic regions substantial autonomy while maintaining national cohesion. In this optimistic scenario, the NUG successfully navigates the complex negotiations required to satisfy the various ethnic armed organizations’ demands while building functioning state institutions. International recognition follows, aid flows in to support reconstruction, and Myanmar begins the long process of healing from decades of military rule and civil conflict.

But the second path sees the National Unity Government diminished to a puppet state at best, with limited actual authority beyond the territories directly controlled by its armed wing. With each patch of territory controlled by a different militia, and each militia free to rule over its territory as it sees fit, Myanmar could very quickly become a patchwork of autonomous regions minding their own business or fighting as they see fit. Perhaps the National Unity Government rules over one such area; perhaps they even speak for Myanmar on the global stage, maintaining diplomatic relations and a seat at the United Nations. But there’s no guarantee that anybody else in Myanmar listens to their directives or accepts their authority.

In that version of the country, strange as it may be to say, there might still be room for a junta that hasn’t fallen at all. If each group rules over three, five, eight, ten percent of the country’s territory, controlling their own fiefdoms with their own rules and revenue sources, what’s one more? The military regime could persist as simply another armed faction controlling a portion of Myanmar’s territory, perhaps the urban core, while the country fragments into a collection of semi-independent statelets that share little beyond nominal allegiance to a central government that exists more in theory than in practice.

This fragmentation scenario would represent a form of victory for the resistance in that the junta’s nationwide control would be broken, but it would hardly constitute the democratic transformation that many have fought and died for. It would instead create a situation reminiscent of Somalia in the 1990s or Libya after 2011—a country in name only, with no functioning central authority capable of providing security, services, or governance to its population.

An Uncertain Endgame

If one thing is certain, it’s that Myanmar’s civil war is barely inches from its endgame. The resistance has achieved what seemed impossible just a year ago, systematically dismantling the junta’s control across the vast majority of Myanmar’s territory. The Tatmadaw has been pushed back to its core strongholds, suffering defeat after defeat, hemorrhaging troops through desertion and surrender, and watching its authority evaporate across the countryside. The momentum clearly favors the resistance, and the question is no longer whether the junta can reassert control over Myanmar, but whether it can survive at all.

But that endgame can still go a whole lot of different ways. The path from the current situation to final resolution remains murky, with multiple scenarios ranging from Chinese intervention to internal Tatmadaw collapse to popular urban uprising all remaining possible. The resistance may achieve a breakthrough through one of these paths, or they may find themselves locked in a prolonged stalemate with a cornered but still dangerous regime. The junta may fall completely, or it may persist in a reduced form, or it may even negotiate some form of transition that preserves elements of military influence in a future government.

Equally uncertain is what comes after the junta’s defeat, should that defeat materialize. The resistance coalition that has proven so effective at fighting the Tatmadaw may fracture when faced with the challenge of building a new Myanmar. The National Unity Government’s vision of federal democracy may prevail, or the country may fragment into ethnic and regional fiefdoms. The international community may rally to support reconstruction, or Myanmar may find itself isolated and impoverished, with armed groups competing for control of resources and territory.

There’s no guarantee that the finished result will even be recognizable as a nation, let alone as Myanmar. The country that emerges from this conflict may bear little resemblance to the Myanmar that existed before the coup, or even to the Myanmar that existed before decades of military rule. It may be more democratic, or it may simply be differently authoritarian. It may be unified, or it may be fragmented. It may find peace, or it may continue to suffer violence, just under different banners and for different reasons.

What remains clear is that Myanmar stands at a historic crossroads, with the old order crumbling but the new order yet to be determined. The coming months will likely prove decisive, as the resistance tests its strategies for breaking the junta’s remaining strongholds and as the various factions begin to reveal their true intentions for Myanmar’s future. The world watches, hoping for the best but uncertain what that best might look like, as Myanmar’s people continue to fight, suffer, and dream of something better than the nightmare they have endured for far too long.

FAQ

What is the Three Brotherhood Alliance?

The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) is a coordinated resistance coalition formed in 2019 by three groups: the Araken Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. They united while fighting separate battles against the Tatmadaw before the 2021 coup, and after consolidating territory and training troops, launched Operation 1027 in October 2023, which transformed scattered insurgencies into a formidable coordinated offensive capable of challenging the military junta.

How much territory do the rebels currently control?

As of July 2024, according to The Economist, the junta controls just fourteen percent of Myanmar’s territory and only one-third of its population in areas under stable control. The resistance controls the vast majority of the country, including most border regions with China, Bangladesh, India, and significant portions of the countryside. The junta’s remaining stronghold is a critical stretch joining the three largest cities: Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw.

Why have junta troops been retreating so consistently?

Junta troops lack adequate training, fighting discipline, and experience, and generally prefer survival over dying for the regime. Many were forced into military service against their will. When troops at isolated outposts hear that rebels are successfully overrunning similar positions, they typically retreat before the rebels arrive rather than fight. This pattern has repeated at increasingly larger installations, with troops often abandoning weapons, equipment, and even prisoners, or surrendering en masse including generals posted to regional defense positions.

What is the National Unity Government?

The National Unity Government (NUG) is a government-in-exile operating in hiding inside Myanmar. It represents most resistance groups including the 3BHA and has established a complete shadow government structure with a president, vice president, state counsellor, prime minister, and full cabinet. The NUG handles internal affairs between militias and foreign relations with other nations. Nearly nine in ten members of Myanmar’s diaspora have a favorable opinion of them, and they’ve articulated a vision for federal democracy with ethnic autonomy.

Why is taking the cities so much harder than taking the countryside?

Urban warfare presents fundamentally different challenges than the guerrilla tactics that brought rebel success. Retreating junta troops have consolidated in defensible positions with a nation’s worth of military equipment, creating numeric concentrations where tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, and elite troops can be deployed effectively together. The resistance, built and trained for asymmetric warfare in jungles and hills, lacks the heavy equipment and conventional warfare capabilities needed for frontal assaults on fortified urban positions, and such attacks could result in tens of thousands of casualties.

What role is China playing in Myanmar’s civil war?

China has historically balanced support between the junta and resistance groups, but has recently shifted toward favoring the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Beijing has thanked the 3BHA for helping suppress cyber-scamming operations that defraud Chinese citizens of billions annually and has established relations with resistance groups controlling border areas. China recently promised to help the junta run a census and election, likely offering a peaceful exit, but could increase material support to the resistance or even intervene militarily if the junta refuses reconciliation, though direct intervention remains unlikely.

What is the siege strategy and why is it considered Plan A?

The siege strategy involves encircling junta strongholds and waiting rather than launching costly frontal assaults. By cutting supply lines and forcing the regime to consume its own reserves while morale deteriorates, the resistance hopes to trigger either a coup by generals against Min Aung Hlaing or a mutiny by junior officers and enlisted troops. Combined with embedded resistance cells in cities recruiting and establishing networks, this could inspire popular urban uprisings that topple the cities from within, forcing the junta into defending only its largest bases—a losing position they likely couldn’t sustain.

Could Myanmar become a failed state after the junta falls?

There’s a significant risk of fragmentation. No single faction would be powerful enough to control others after the junta’s defeat. While the National Unity Government offers a unifying vision, there’s no guarantee diverse resistance groups will support it. Many militias act in their own ethnic or regional interests, some are autocratic or exploitative in territories they control, and some depend on drug trade or organized crime. Myanmar could become a patchwork of autonomous regions with different militias ruling their own fiefdoms, potentially leaving the NUG as merely a diplomatic facade with no real authority, or even allowing a weakened junta to persist as just another armed faction controlling a portion of territory.