Burkina Faso: The World's Most-Neglected War

How Burkina Faso became the world's most neglected crisis, with 60% of the country under jihadist control, two million civilians besieged, and rising

Simon Whistler March 4, 2026

The words could not have been starker. Last year, the national security-focused outlet War on the Rocks published a piece with the opening line: “Burkina Faso (…) is dying.” Delving into the West African nation’s ongoing jihadist insurgency, it hinted at pressures so great the country may soon cease to exist. This was not hyperbole. Just twelve months later, up to sixty percent of Burkina Faso is in the hands of Islamist rebels. Two million civilians—equivalent to ten percent of the population—are trapped in cities besieged by insurgents. As the death toll balloons, the overwhelmed military is forging ties with Russia to try and stem its losses. Burkina Faso today is a nation in the midst of a full-blown meltdown. Perpetually drowned out by other conflicts, the war in Burkina Faso is in danger of becoming the great, forgotten tragedy of our time. Yet that does not mean it is without wider impact. From counterterrorism to geopolitics, this overlooked crisis is shaping the world in unpredictable ways.

Key Takeaways

The Norwegian Refugee Council ranked Burkina Faso the world’s number one most-neglected crisis in both 2023 and 2024, receiving less funding and visibility than any other displacement crisis on Earth.
Up to sixty percent of Burkina Faso is now outside government control, held by the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM coalition and Islamic State Sahel Province.
Thirty-nine towns and cities housing two million people are under jihadist blockade, with 400 health facilities shut down, another 400 barely functioning, and 6,100 schools closed.
Violent deaths rose from 3,627 in 2022 to over 8,400 in 2023—a 137-percent increase—with ACLED recording over 900 deaths in May 2024 alone.
The Burkinabe military executed 735 civilians in 2023, up seventy percent from 2022, with more than half of victims across Burkina Faso and Mali belonging to the Fulani minority.
Captain Ibrahim Traoré expelled France’s 600-strong Operation Sabre special forces contingent in 2023 and pivoted toward Russia, with Russian soldiers present in the country since November and Foreign Minister Lavrov visiting in June.

The World’s Number One Most-Neglected Crisis

Every summer, the Norwegian Refugee Council publishes a list of the “World’s Most-Neglected Crises.” By analyzing rates of media coverage and humanitarian funding, plus diplomatic initiatives to solve the problem, the NRC is able to assign every displacement crisis on Earth a ranking. Some—like those in Gaza and Ukraine—score highly on almost every conceivable metric. Others, like the war in Sudan, consistently rank low. And then there is Burkina Faso. In both 2023 and 2024, the NRC awarded the West African nation the number one spot on its list, meaning it got less funding and less visibility than any other crisis on Earth. That makes this the war one could mention to reasonably informed people and get nothing back but a blank look. There are reasons for this. Over the past few months, the military junta that runs the country has banned multiple international outlets, including heavy-hitters like the BBC. Meanwhile, local journalists have been scared off writing about the crisis due to heavy punishments for anyone critical of the army’s leadership. Last fall, for example, the government forcibly conscripted two journalists—one of whom was in his sixties—to go and fight on the frontlines. Still, for all the barriers to doing journalism in Burkina Faso, the extent of the global media’s collective shrug is something to behold. Data provided to the Economist by analytics firm Chartbeat shows that, every month, some 100,000 stories are published globally on the Ukraine and Gaza wars. The NRC, by contrast, has called coverage of the Burkinabe War “negligible.” Both Sudan and Myanmar, to choose just two examples, are criminally overlooked. Even so, Burkina Faso may be a special case—a war so neglected as to be all but invisible. Maybe it is in part due to the nation’s reputation for chaos. In 2022 alone, the country suffered two military coups—the latter bringing to power current leader Ibrahim Traoré. It could also be due to the neighborhood Burkina Faso lies in. Part of the Sahel—the strip of land where the burning heat of the Sahara gives way to the plains of the African Savannah—Burkina Faso has the misfortune to sit in the middle of a region-wide insurgency. Its immediate neighbors, Mali and Niger, are roiled by battles with jihadists, while further east, Nigeria and Chad likewise struggle to contain armed groups. But even in this dangerous corner of the world, Burkina Faso should stand out. The Economist claims that “more than two thirds” of deaths in the Central Sahel due to jihadism take place within its borders. This year, the Global Terrorism Index labeled it “the country with the highest impact from terrorism” anywhere on Earth. At the heart of this lie two violent groups: the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM coalition, and the local ISIS branch, Islamic State Sahel Province (better known as IS Sahel). Both are radical, both are powerful, and both are extremely dangerous. News recently broke of a JNIM attack on an army outpost that killed over 100 Burkinabe soldiers. Overall, the two insurgent groups combined are thought to have placed around sixty percent of Burkina Faso outside of government control. While that has been a disaster for the military junta in Ouagadougou, it has been even worse for the civilians caught up in it.

Besieged Cities and a Humanitarian Catastrophe

If one is looking for an easy shorthand to demonstrate the dire straits Burkina Faso is in, one would be hard pressed to find anything that could beat the blockaded towns. Scattered across the country, 39 towns and cities are home to a combined two million people—nearly ten percent of the population. Surrounded by armed fighters, each is under a movement ban imposed by the jihadists as retribution for government attempts to recruit civilian fighters. Because the insurgents lack heavy weaponry, these are not traditional sieges in which buildings inside the noose are heavily shelled. Instead, citizens are merely trapped inside, unable to leave. But that word “merely” hides a whole universe of suffering. Burkina Faso, as a poor nation, already had over four-in-ten of its citizens living below the poverty line. These blockades are now ensuring that this poverty spreads ever more widely. The New Humanitarian reports that food is scarce inside these towns and that water systems are failing to properly work. Local healthcare is on the verge of collapse. The NRC interviewed a woman living in the commune of Kongoussi who described how her family has been reduced to eating leaves. Across the country as a whole, the stats are dire. Al Jazeera claims that 400 health facilities have been shut down, with another 400 barely able to function, leaving 3.6 million without access to healthcare. Likewise, some 6,100 schools have been forced to shutter, depriving children of education. About sixty percent of the country’s two million internally displaced people are children. Many are stuck in camps that lack even basic services. To add insult to injury, some of these camps are themselves under blockade. And then there are the deaths. The fighting in Burkina Faso has led to a sharp spike in violent deaths. Back in 2022, as things were starting to slide toward chaos, there were 3,627 recorded fatalities—about as many as died in the three decades of the Northern Irish Troubles. Last year, that number rose to over 8,400, a 137-percent increase. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded over 900 violent deaths in May 2024 alone. All this needs to be placed in the context of violence happening elsewhere in the Sahel. In the decade from 2013 to 2023, ACLED records that at least 42,000 people were killed in jihadist-related violence across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Some 3.3 million were forced to flee their homes.

From Uprising to Insurgency: How Burkina Faso Fell Apart

Back in 2007, a mere one percent of all global deaths related to Islamist terror took place in the Sahel. By 2022, it had risen to 43 percent. In the Burkinabe case, the answer could be simplified down to “award-winning bad luck.” In 2014, a grassroots uprising overthrew longtime dictator Blaise Compaoré and began a short-lived experiment with democracy. Unfortunately, this shock to the system coincided with a growing insurgency in neighboring Mali. As early as 2015, jihadists began staging attacks across the border. But it would be concerted recruitment efforts by these armed groups in Burkina Faso’s poorest, remotest regions that would really set things ablaze. There, the jihadists found disenfranchised, forgotten people who could be seduced by their message. War on the Rocks explained it: “Longstanding economic, ethnic, political and social divisions in the country’s under-developed periphery proved ideal kindling for jihadist insurrections.” The result was a slow-burning fire—one that initially took the form of a homegrown insurgency near the Malian border, but which soon swept across nearly every single region. Crisis Group reports that, of Burkina Faso’s thirteen provinces, jihadists are now active in eleven of them. This spread fueled yet more political chaos. In January 2022, the military overthrew the government, only for the new junta to in turn be overthrown by Captain Ibrahim Traoré. In both cases, the soldiers argued that they were stepping in to save their nation from a weak government unable to contain the violence. In the wake of both coups, the violence only got worse. It used to be that local commanders were given leeway to cut regional peace deals with the jihadists. When the juntas forbade the practice, the death toll skyrocketed. The final blow was dropped on this national crisis in 2023, when Captain Traoré abruptly announced the end of Operation Sabre. Established in 2009 to help fight regional terrorism, Operation Sabre was a contingent of 600 French special forces operating on Burkinabe soil. It was Sabre that came to the rescue of American Green Berets during the 2017 Niger ambush. In 2023, Sabre was expelled from Burkina Faso, part of a wider tilt in the Sahel away from the former colonial power of France and toward Russia. When the French departed, they took their expertise with them. Violence quickly rose.

Military Atrocities and the Persecution of the Fulani

Jihadists are not the only violent actors in Burkina Faso’s forgotten war. While they are the most brutal by far, other actors contribute to the ever-growing civilian death toll—not least among them, the Burkinabe military itself. The thing about fighting an insurgency is that fighters will always have the option of blending in with the civilian population. How does one balance the need to root out terrorists with the need to protect civilians? Good intentions seem pretty far down the list of priorities of Burkina Faso’s military. In April of this year, Human Rights Watch documented how the army implemented collective punishment for the villages of Nodin and Soro, where the NGO alleges that they mass-executed a combined 223 civilians, including 56 children. Although shocking, this was just the latest in a series of military-led atrocities against the civilian population. A year earlier, the army killed 156 villagers in a place known as Karma. Voice of America reports that “mass killings of villagers have become common in northern Burkina Faso.” The New York Times notes: “Islamist militants have killed more civilians in Burkina Faso than the military or militias have by far.” Still, the scale of government-sanctioned killings is both eye-watering and constantly growing. According to ACLED, the number of civilians executed by soldiers rose from 430 in 2022 to 735 in 2023—an increase of seventy percent. In May alone, the project records 270 such killings, contributing “to the military forces being the deadliest perpetrator of violence toward civilians in May (2024).” An additional complicating factor is that many of these killings are done seemingly based on ethnicity, with the targets most frequently coming from the Fulani minority. A group of 30 million who live across West Africa, the Fulani are almost all Muslims. In Burkina Faso and other states, they are broadly marginalized—mistrusted and feared for their supposed susceptibility to jihadist recruitment. Foreign Policy reports on the extent of this lethal discrimination: “More than half of the civilians killed by the military or ethnic militias in Burkina Faso and Mali last year were Fulani—despite the fact that they make up around 10 and 14 percent of each country, respectively.” That massacre in Karma, which claimed the lives of 156 villagers—nearly all of them are thought to have come from the Fulani minority. As the military executes innocent Fulanis for suspected ties to the jihadists, more and more Fulanis start to feel like the only way to protect their families is to pick up a gun and join the insurgency. As War on the Rocks put it: “It has been well documented that the security services’ abuses have fueled radicalization.” The junta is also dismantling any remaining element of democratic accountability. After pledging to hold elections by July of this year following the 2022 coup, the junta has recently declared it will remain in power for another five years.

Local Militias and the Spiral of Violence

In the last days of President Blaise Compaoré’s rule, growing insecurity in the Burkinabe hinterland led local civilians to form self-defense groups. Known in the local language as Koglweogo—which Crisis Group translates as “guardians of the bush”—their goal was to fight the bandits cropping up in multiple regions. However, as the insurgency in Mali began to spill across Burkina Faso’s borders, the Koglweogo found themselves fighting not bandits, but jihadists. It is likely this track record that the democratically elected government had in mind in January 2020 when it incorporated self-defense groups into an official paramilitary structure. Known as the Homeland Defense Volunteers (or VDPs, after their French name: Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie), the force was initially intended to bolster the understaffed army. With just 12,000 people on their rolls—including the Gendarmerie—the Burkinabe security services were judged too small to effectively fight multiple jihadist groups. It would not be until after Captain Traoré’s coup of September 2022 that the VDPs would grow into significant players. Announcing his plans for “total war” against the insurgents, Traoré called for 50,000 new recruits to join the VDPs. The result was the VDPs becoming what the ACLED Project has called “the fourth-most active armed actor in Burkina Faso, after JNIM, the military, and IS Sahel.” Today, they can be found in almost every province. Because they receive little training, volunteers tend to die on the frontlines at a higher rate than ordinary soldiers. Worse, some of them have been implicated in horrific war crimes. Like the military, the VDPs are known for targeting Fulani villagers. Crisis Group explains how: “Their actions paradoxically contribute to escalating violence through the alleged crimes that some of them commit against civilians, sparking retaliatory cycles among armed factions.” Unlike the military, the VDPs do not just target civilians they suspect of sympathizing with the jihadists. Crisis Group describes how some VDP leaders misuse their authority to settle scores with their neighbors or to simply drive people off land they want for themselves. The Council on Foreign Relations notes: “A situation in which every citizen is a potential ‘extremist’ gives members of the armed forces the pretext to attack innocent civilians in the name of going after extremists.” The ACLED Project puts it bluntly: “The resort to arming civilians in the Burkinabe context has led to serious human rights violations and an escalation of violence.” As the VDPs have spread into Koulpelogo province, their local conflict with JNIM jihadists has resulted in what the project characterized as “extreme” violence on the border with neighboring Togo.

Regional Spillover and the Threat to West Africa’s Coastal States

It is here that the most worrying dimension of the entire Burkina Faso conflict emerges: its ability to spill over into nearby states. While the wider Sahel region has lurched into crisis, West Africa’s coastal states have remained mostly untouched. Yet that may be about to change. With Burkina Faso directly bordering Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, there are growing fears that the violence could soon sweep over multiple American allies. In the years before Burkina Faso went completely to hell, the clearest sign that things were going downhill was the way jihadist groups crossing from Mali were able to both recruit locally and launch spectacular attacks on Burkinabe soil. Something similar now seems to be happening to West Africa’s coastal states. Already, jihadists based in Burkina Faso have launched attacks in Togo and Benin before retreating back across the border. As the Burkinabe conflict increases in intensity, there are fears that Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire could become targets too. Foreign Policy wrote in May that the only reason Ghana has not yet been targeted is because “insurgents see their access to the country as a safe haven and smuggling route as too useful to destabilize with direct attacks.” Ghana’s worst-case scenario may lie between “becoming the next Burkina Faso” and “just carrying on as normal”: a sharp uptick in jihadist activity that kills civilians, drains resources, and badly destabilizes national politics. From an international perspective, what happens in states like Ghana matters for counterterrorism efforts. Since the junta in Niger expelled US forces, Washington has been making Ghana one of its new focal points from which to fight jihadist networks. Earlier this summer, US Africa Command oversaw the Flintlock counterterrorism exercises in Ghana to help fortify it against Islamist violence. Should Ghana itself become the site of a jihadist insurgency in its north, it will further imperil Pentagon efforts to stop the spread of violent extremism—a major worry, since many of these extremist groups use pockets of lawlessness to plot attacks against the US and Europe.

Russia’s Expanding Footprint in the Sahel

The Burkinabe War has also unleashed significant geopolitical consequences—perhaps most notably, the steady encroachment of Russia and former Wagner Group forces into the Sahel. For a long time, Burkina Faso was considered a security partner of the West, albeit one that never received as much funding as it really needed. That all changed following the two coups of 2022. Rather than fund Captain Traoré’s junta, most of Ouagadougou’s backers cut the nation off. While this may have been all they could realistically do, it opened the door for Traoré’s pivot to Russia. Following the lead of the military junta in Mali, the captain responded to the West’s efforts by throwing his lot in with Moscow. On a recent visit to Ouagadougou, Al Jazeera reported that “the capital’s walls are adorned with pro-Russian graffiti, and Russian flags fly in the streets.” Since November, Russian soldiers have been present in the nation, and this June Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveled to Burkina Faso to declare Moscow would supply the junta with additional weaponry. Although the stated aim is to help fight the insurgents, such Russian largesse is unlikely to make much of a difference. The Foreign Policy Research Institute reports that Wagner’s arrival in Mali allowed the regime to retake important territory—such as the strategic town of Kidal—but only at the cost of a major increase in civilian deaths and an upsurge of violence. What really matters to the Kremlin likely is not subduing a jihadist insurgency in faraway Burkina Faso, but making sure another country in the so-called “Global South” is sympathetic to Moscow. Multiple Sahel states are now courting Vladimir Putin’s regime. Niger has joined Mali and Burkina Faso in calling in the Russians, while Chad’s leader is trying to be allies with both Paris and Moscow. In Sudan’s civil war, the rebranded remnants of Wagner initially backed the Rapid Support Forces, although Putin now seems to be pivoting to the opposing Sudanese Armed Forces. As for Central African Republic, Wagner has been there so long that there is a statue to them in the capital, Bangui. The result of all this is the slow but steady building of a band of Russia sympathizers across West and Central Africa—sympathizers that the Kremlin clearly hopes will side with it and China against America and Europe in any new cold war. For all that Burkina Faso might represent a headache for the wider world, the people who are suffering the most should not be forgotten: the 22 million citizens of this beleaguered nation. For many in Burkina Faso, the last few years have been a non-stop nightmare, one in which more and more of their country lapses into violence while the rest of the world does nothing but give a collective shrug. The media coverage of Burkina Faso’s collapse is even more lacking than coverage of the wars in Sudan and Myanmar. For millions of people, this is their lives—a war devastating their homeland. At the very least, the rest of the world should try to be aware of their suffering.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the biggest problem in Burkina Faso?

The biggest problem in Burkina Faso is the ongoing jihadist insurgency, which has resulted in significant violence, displacement, and loss of life, with over 2 million people forced to flee their homes since the conflict began in 2019, and more than 2 million civilians trapped in cities besieged by insurgents, accounting for around 10% of the population.

Why can’t Americans go to Burkina Faso?

Americans are advised against traveling to Burkina Faso due to the high risk of violence, terrorism, and kidnapping, with the US Department of State issuing a Level 4 travel advisory, indicating a ‘do not travel’ warning, as a result of the escalating conflict and instability in the country, which has been exacerbated by the presence of jihadist groups such as JNIM and IS Sahel.

Can girls go to school in Burkina Faso?

The ability of girls to attend school in Burkina Faso is severely impacted by the ongoing conflict, with many schools closed or destroyed, and girls being disproportionately affected by the displacement and violence, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council, which has highlighted the need for increased support for education and protection of civilians, particularly girls and women, in the face of the growing humanitarian crisis.

What was Burkina Faso called before WWII?

Before World War II, Burkina Faso was known as Upper Volta, a French colony that gained independence in 1960, and was later renamed Burkina Faso in 1984, meaning ‘land of upright people’ in the local Mossi language, with the country’s name change reflecting its cultural and national identity.

What percentage of Burkina Faso is controlled by jihadists?

It is estimated that around 60% of Burkina Faso is under the control of jihadist groups, including the al-Qaeda affiliated JNIM coalition and the local ISIS branch, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), which have been responsible for numerous attacks and have placed significant pressure on the government and military, resulting in a substantial loss of territory and control.

What is the humanitarian crisis in Burkina Faso?

The humanitarian crisis in Burkina Faso is characterized by widespread displacement, violence, and loss of life, with over 2 million people forced to flee their homes, and more than 2 million civilians trapped in cities besieged by insurgents, resulting in a significant need for humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter, and protection, with the Norwegian Refugee Council highlighting the crisis as one of the most neglected in the world.

Why did they do a coup in Burkina Faso?

The coup in Burkina Faso was carried out in 2022, which brought Ibrahim Traoré to power, following a period of instability and unrest, with the coup being the second in the country that year, and marking a significant turning point in the country’s history, with Traoré’s leadership being characterized by a strong stance against jihadist groups and a desire to restore stability and security in the country.

Who is the richest man in Burkina Faso?

There is no publicly available information on the richest man in Burkina Faso, as the country’s economy and business landscape are not well-documented, and the focus has largely been on the political and humanitarian crisis, rather than the economic or business sector, with the country’s leadership, including Ibrahim Traoré, being more prominent in the news and public discourse.

Key Takeaways

The World’s Number One Most-Neglected Crisis

Besieged Cities and a Humanitarian Catastrophe

From Uprising to Insurgency: How Burkina Faso Fell Apart

Military Atrocities and the Persecution of the Fulani

Local Militias and the Spiral of Violence

Regional Spillover and the Threat to West Africa’s Coastal States

Russia’s Expanding Footprint in the Sahel

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the biggest problem in Burkina Faso?

Why can’t Americans go to Burkina Faso?

Can girls go to school in Burkina Faso?

What was Burkina Faso called before WWII?

What percentage of Burkina Faso is controlled by jihadists?

What is the humanitarian crisis in Burkina Faso?

Why did they do a coup in Burkina Faso?

Who is the richest man in Burkina Faso?

Related Coverage

Sources

Frequently Asked Questions